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Awake-Dreaming Indistinguishability Problem? 
by 
MOK Ka Yan 
Master of Philosophy 
 
In his Meditations On First Philosophy, Descartes (1641/1911) points out the awake-
dreaming indistinguishability problem, which calls into question the reliability of our 
knowledge about the external world. The argument can be understood as follows: 
 
P1) Nothing can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in X when she 
is actually in Y. 
P2) A person can know that she is in Y only if there is something to rule out her being 
duped into believing she is in X when she is actually in Y. 
C) Hence, the subject cannot know that she is in Y. 
 
The problem can be interpreted in the form of A1 where X represents a dream state 
and Y represents an awake state. It can also be interpreted in the form of A2 where X 
represents an awake state and Y represents a dream state. I define the problem in the 
form of A1(X: a dream state; Y: an awake state) and A2(X: an awake state; Y: a dream 
state). The problem also involves an epistemological aspect and a phenomenological 
aspect. The epistemological aspect concerns the question of whether dream states and 
awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable. If so, the problem would be 
irresolvable in principle and result in a great epistemic threat. The phenomenological 
aspect concerns how the experience appears to the subject and affects the judgment 
she makes about her current state. In order to fully resolve the problem, as I will argue, 
we need to show that both A1 and A2 are unsound and resolve both aspects of the 
problem.  
 
McGinn (2004), Ichikawa (2008, 2009), and Sosa (2005) try to resolve the awake-
dreaming indistinguishability problem by defending (different versions of) the 
imagination view of dreaming. Among the three, Ichikawa holds the strongest version, 
where he denies that percepts and beliefs occur in dreams; McGinn denies percepts 
occur in dreams while Sosa denies beliefs occur in dreams. I argue that their arguments, 
namely drawing a sharp distinction between percepts and images along with denying 




the indistinguishability problem. My goal of this research is to reinvigorate the 
imagination view of dreaming. Instead of holding a sharp distinction between percepts 
and images along with denying belief occur in dreams, I attempt to bridge the gap 
between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming to defend this view. I contend that the 
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Dreaming and dreams have been topics of philosophical inquiry since ancient times. 
Dreams are usually postulated as posing an epistemic threat to the reliability of 
perceptual knowledge. This is prominent in Descartes’s argument: I cannot rule out 
the possibility that I am dreaming now. Senses can be deceptive. Therefore, I should 
not trust my senses. How can dreams, which occur during sleep, threaten the reliability 
of perceptual knowledge which can only be acquired in awake states? Dreams are said 
to have subjectively indistinguishable characters from those of awake states, as 
Descartes (1641/1911) suggests, “there are no certain indications by which we may 
clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep” (p.7). This provokes an epistemological 
inquiry over the reliability of perceptual knowledge. It also leads to a 
phenomenological study of the nature of dream states. Descartes attempts to dispel the 
epistemic threat in the Sixth Meditation by arguing that there are essential differences 
between dream states and awake states and we can distinguish between them. Senses 
are not deceptive and we can trust them. This move aims at restoring the general 
reliability of perceptual knowledge. However, if there are essential differences 
between awake states and dream states, we should be able to distinguish between them 
and tell which state we are currently in. If we cannot tell we are in a dream state, it can 
lead us back to the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. This is a phenomenal 
threat brought by the occurrence of non-lucid dreaming where the subject is unaware 
of the fact that she is in a dream state and mistakenly believes she is in an awake state. 
If such unawareness problem is not tackled properly, the epistemic threat will still 
persist.  
 
Recently the focus on the study of dreaming has shifted from the epistemological 




experience is and how it is related to the study of consciousness. These two aspects are 
interrelated. The unawareness problem in the dream state and the limited control over 
the dream content cast doubt on the reliability of introspective knowledge (whether I 
know my current state) and in turn on the reliability of perceptual knowledge (whether 
I know I am being awake and having percepts). Recently the imagination view of 
dreaming has emerged, in an attempt to dispel the epistemic worries brought by 
dreaming. In this thesis, I analyze the arguments of three contemporary philosophers 
defending the imagination view of dreaming. They are Colin McGinn, Jonathan 
Ichikawa and Ernest Sosa. I argue that their approaches fail to dispel the epistemic 
threat posed by the dreaming phenomenon. I attempt to modify the imagination view 
of dreaming so as to resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: 
In chapter one, I delineate the form of the awake-dreaming indistinguishability 
problem and briefly outline how the problem can be resolved. 
In chapter two, I evaluate the arguments of McGinn, Ichikawa, and Sosa to elucidate 
why their arguments fail to resolve the problem. I divide this chapter into two parts, 
each focusing on one of their main approaches: A) the sharp distinction between 
percepts and images, and B) the denial of belief in dreams. In part A), I argue that the 
sharp distinction arguments are misguided and do not help resolve the problem. Some 
even worsen the problem. Basically, their arguments are misguided in two ways: 1. 
taking hallucinations to be percepts, which poses a further threat to the reliability of 
perceptual knowledge, and 2. involving what I call “an awake-state stereotyped 
conception of imaginings” as being higher-order (with the subject’s awareness of the 




non-lucid dreaming. In part B), I argue that how Ichikawa and Sosa deny that dream 
beliefs are beliefs is not legitimate. They stick to what I call “an awake-state 
stereotyped conception of belief” as being perceptual and functional. This limits the 
scope of belief, which hinders a fair study of dream beliefs and a more thorough 
examination of belief. Moreover, such an approach is ad hoc and does not resolve the 
awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. 
In chapter three, I attempt to provide a modified version of the imagination view of 
dreaming to resolve the problem. I argue that awake states and dream states are not 
fundamentally indistinguishable. This dispels the pressing epistemic threat where the 
subject is doomed not to be able to distinguish between the two and tell which state 
they are currently in on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence. Finally, I 
attempt to dispel the phenomenal threat of dreaming concerning the unawareness 
problem in the dream state by bridging the gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid 
dreaming: they fall on a continuum rather than being dichotomously distinct. Moreover, 
the trainability of lucid dreaming further undermines the phenomenal threat posed by 
dreaming. I round up the thesis by briefly suggesting some insight brought by my 





CHAPTER 1: The Awake-Dreaming Indistinguishability Problem 
In the First Meditation, Descartes (1641/1911) points out the awake-dreaming 
indistinguishability problem, which calls into question the reliability of our knowledge 
about the external world. The argument can be understood as follows: 
 
P1) Nothing can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in X when she 
is actually in Y. 
P2) A person can know she is in Y only if there is something to rule out her being 
duped into believing she is in X when she is actually in Y. 
C) Hence, the subject cannot know she is in Y. 
 
In the philosophy literature, it is unclear in what form the problem is illustrated 
exactly.1 The problem can be interpreted in the form of A1 where X represents a dream 
state and Y represents an awake state. It can also be interpreted in the form of A2 where 
X represents an awake state and Y represents a dream state. As I will show, different 
interpretations can result in different consequences. It is important to define the 
problem, before one attempts to resolve it. I define the problem in the form of A1(X: 
a dream state; Y: an awake state) and A2(X: an awake state; Y: a dream state). The 
problem also involves an epistemological aspect and a phenomenological aspect. The 
epistemological aspect concerns the question of whether dream states and awake states 
are fundamentally indistinguishable.2 The phenomenological aspect concerns how the 
                                                     
1 Even Descartes (1641/1911), the one who points out the problem, does not clearly delineate in what 
form of the argument the problem lies. McGinn (2004), Ichikawa (2009), and Sosa (2005) are along the 
same line. They just roughly take the problem to be the subject being unable to distinguish between 
dream states and awake states, whether the subject is actually in a dream state or an awake state is not 
addressed. 
2 This means these two kinds of states are indistinguishable to the subject by their very nature: there is 
no difference between them that can be spotted by the subject, with the assumption that the subject is 




experience appears to the subject and affects the judgment she makes about her current 
state. Two important questions arising from the phenomenological aspect of the 
problem are what makes a correct judgment and what makes a faulty judgment. If 
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, it is impossible for 
the subject to make a correct judgment about her current state on a well-justified basis 
from the experiential evidence available. P1 of A1, on the condition that the subject 
who is rational should be able to spot the difference between dream states and awake 
states (if there is any that can be spotted) and tell their current state, if true, shows 
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, which results in a 
great epistemic threat: it is impossible for the subject to distinguish between dream 
states and awake states. The awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem will be 
irresolvable in principle. The whole knowledge system (about the external world) may 
collapse as a result. 
 
In order to avoid such a pessimistic view and save our knowledge system, Descartes 
tries to resolve the problem in the Sixth Meditation, where he claims that we can 
discern a key difference between these two kinds of states. I argue that such a claim is 
only the first step to addressing, but cannot fully resolve, the problem. That claim can 
be used to show that P1 of A1 is false and thus A1 collapses.3 It means there is at least 
one difference between dream states and awake states that the subject can spot and 
differentiate between the two kinds of states. Then dream states and awake states are 
not fundamentally indistinguishable and the subject should be able to tell she is in an 
awake state when she actually is and at the same time, she should also be able to tell 
                                                     
3 There are two conditions needed to show P1 of A1 is false: 1. there is at least one difference between 
dream states and awake states, and 2. the subject is rational (who can spot the differences and tell he is 




she is in a dream state when she actually is. However, there is non-lucid dreaming 
where the subject cannot tell she is in a dream state when she actually is. A2 still stands 
and the epistemic threat still persists. In order to fully resolve the problem, we need to 
show A2 is unsound and resolve the phenomenological aspect of the problem, namely 
to bridge the gap between non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming. We need to address 
different orders of the awareness of the subject in dreaming: in lucid dreaming, the 
subject possesses a higher-order awareness and she can tell she is dreaming (rather 
than being awake); in non-lucid dreaming, the subject possesses a lower-order 
awareness and she cannot tell she is dreaming (and falsely believes she is being awake). 
If the gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming is not bridged appropriately, 
the phenomenal threat remains in principle and the problem persists. In order to fully 
resolve the problem, we need to collapse both A1 and A2, and resolve both the 
epistemological and the phenomenological aspects of the problem. 
 
A1 & The Epistemological Aspect of the Problem 
In the First Meditation, Descartes (1641/1911) writes, 
 
“How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself in this 
particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, whilst in reality I was lying 
undressed in bed……I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which 
we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep…” 
(p. 7) 
The way he illustrates the problem “distinguish wakefulness from sleep” targets A1. 
 




since it can lead to different interpretations of the problem. If a and b are subjectively 
indistinguishable, it means the subject cannot tell the difference between a and b. This 
claim does not entail that the subject is rational.4 Different interpretations are possible. 
One possible interpretation is that the subject is irrational. Let us call this case 1. In 
this case, even if there are obvious differences between a and b (which rational beings 
are supposed to be able to tell), he is still unable to tell. Another interpretation is that 
the subject is rational. Let us call this case 2. In this case, a and b are fundamentally 
indistinguishable, where they possess features which are indiscernible to humans, so 
even rational beings are unable to tell any difference. Descartes sticks to the features 
of dream states and awake states, which he claims to be identical in content, when 
illustrating the problem. It makes sense to say that he implies that the subject is rational 
and refers to the second interpretation (case 2) in the First Meditation. In that sense, 
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, which results in a 
great epistemic threat: it is impossible for the subject to distinguish between dream 
states and awake states in principle. In this case, the problem can never be resolved as 
there is no clue available for any rational beings to distinguish between these two kinds 
of states. This will pose a great threat to the reliability of our whole knowledge system. 
We may end up being trapped in a virtual reality without genuine knowledge about the 
external world. 
 
The arguments in the First Meditation are unnecessarily strong and fallacious. Features 
(contents in particular) of dream states and awake states are the only factor Descartes 
considers when he illustrates the problem, which is not comprehensive enough. He 
                                                     
4 Here I take rationality to be the ability of the subject to seek any clue to make a judgment about her 
current state on a well-justified basis from the experience. She should be able to spot the difference 




presupposes reality-replicating features of dreams are the key to making faulty 
judgments about one’s current state, which is misguided. He assumes that all dreams 
replicate reality in every aspect and that even rational beings are not able to distinguish 
between dream states and awake states. He does not address the possibility of having 
non-reality-replicating dreams in the First Meditation. Those reality-replicating 
dreams are just hypothetical dreams. It is unclear that whether there exist any reality-
replicating dreams.5 That is unlikely to be the case, given our real-life experiences. 
According to a dream research, dreams typically contain bizarre contents (Waters et al, 
2016, p.1101), which rational beings are supposed to be able to note and use to make 
a correct judgment about the dream state as their current state. If features or contents 
of dreams are the source of the subject’s mistaken judgments about their current state, 
then the subject should be able to note the bizarre contents and make a correct 
judgment about the dream state. However, this is not the case. In non-lucid dreaming, 
no matter how bizarre and ridiculous the dream contents are, the subject cannot tell 
she is dreaming.6 This shows that dream contents are not the source of mistaken 
judgments about one’s current state and the main thing to deal with in order to resolve 
the problem.   
 
From the Epistemological Aspect to the Phenomenological Aspect of the Problem 
Descartes is probably aware that his arguments in the First Meditation are 
unnecessarily strong on reflection. In order to avoid the risk of collapsing the entire 
knowledge system, he shifts to a weaker claim in the Sixth Meditation, where he holds 
                                                     
5 Reality-replicating dreams mean dreams which replicate reality in every detail such that there is no 
clue for the (rational) subject to distinguish between dream states and awake states on a well-justified 
basis from the experiential evidence. If there are reality-replicating dreams, then the awake-dreaming 
indistinguishability problem is irresolvable. 





that there is at least one considerable difference between awake states and dream states 
such that they are not fundamentally indistinguishable. We should dispel the worries 
of inevitable faulty judgments about one’s current state mentioned in the First 
Meditation.  
 
“I ought no longer to fear that falsity may be found in matters every day presented to 
me by my senses. And I ought to set aside all the doubts of these past days as 
hyperbolical and ridiculous, particularly that very common uncertainty respecting 
sleep, which I could not distinguish from the waking state…I find a very notable 
difference between the two…our memory can never connect our dreams one with the 
other, or with the whole course of our lives, as it unites events which happen to us 
while we are awake...I am perfectly assured that these perceptions occur while I am 
waking and not during sleep.” 
(Descartes, 1641/1911, P.32) 
 
Descartes thinks the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem is resolved by 
pointing out this difference between dream states and awake states. That can only show 
dream states and awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable, and show A1 
is unsound. When there is a discernible difference between these two kinds of states, 
the subject who is rational (in standard awake states) can discern the difference and 
tell she is being awake rather than dreaming. In other words, there is something that 
can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in a dream state when she is 
actually in an awake state. This shows that P1 of A1 is false. The whole argument of 





Is the problem fully resolved by collapsing just A1? In other words, can the problem 
be illustrated in the form of A1 only? Sosa (2005) thinks so. He thinks A1 is the source 
of epistemic threat. He believes if A1 is rejected, the epistemic worries are dispelled 
naturally. Before we find the answer to these questions, let us look at what kind of 
epistemic threat A1 and A2 illustrate respectively. 
  
A1: 
When the subject cannot know she is in an awake state, she cannot tell she is being 
awake on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence. She may think she is 
dreaming or being awake without a well-justified ground on which the judgment is 
made. She may deny percepts and the information about the external world. She may 
take what she actually perceives to be internal mental activities;7 She may also take 
internal mental activities to be percepts. In this case, the subject may suspend beliefs, 
hold false beliefs, or hold true but unjustified beliefs. Knowledge is defined as 
undefeated justified true belief (Paxson, 1969). For something to be counted as 
knowledge, the subject should be aware of the appropriate causal relations and form 
judgements accordingly.8 This is not the case with the scenario illustrated by A1. The 
subject is not aware of the causal relations and does not form a well-justified judgment. 
Therefore, no knowledge results.  
 
A2: 
When the subject cannot know she is in a dream state, she takes dream states to be 
awake states. She mistakenly takes dreams to be percepts and ends up having false 
                                                     
7 Percepts should stand in appropriate relations to external stimuli (Brogaard & Gatzia, 2017; Gibson, 
1970). It is not the case with dreams, for they are generated internally. Dream contents may be affected 
by the surrounding environment but dreams are not caused by sensory inputs (Noreika et al, 2010, p.40).  
8 There are different accounts of knowledge. I do not look into all of them, due to the limited space 




beliefs about the external world. Even if she happens to form true beliefs, they are not 
formed on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence. According to the 
knowledge theory mentioned above, no knowledge results. 
 
Both A1 and A2 yield an epistemic threat where no knowledge results, in a different 
sense. Collapsing A1 does not entail that A2 also collapses. The epistemic threat 
brought by A2 is still in force and needs to be addressed. Therefore, Sosa is mistaken 
in thinking that just collapsing A1 can resolve the problem.  
 
It is not difficult to collapse A1 and resolve the epistemological aspect of the problem. 
This task is already accomplished by Descartes’s arguments in the Sixth Meditation. It 
is a bit more challenging to collapse A2 and resolve the phenomenological aspect of 
the problem. It is impossible to show P1 of A2 is false due to the occurrence of non-
lucid dreaming. Rather, we should argue that P2 of A2 is false, using the occurrence 
of lucid dreaming. To resolve the phenomenological aspect of the problem, we should 
bridge the gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming.9  
 
Descartes just stops at the first step without moving on to collapse A2 and resolve the 
phenomenological aspect of the problem. The considerable difference he mentions 
cannot collapse A2 as it does not apply to non-lucid dreaming. The difference 
Descartes mentions is about the features of the states. He alludes to the features (and 
contents in particular) of dreams both when he sketches the awake-dreaming 
indistinguishability problem in the First Meditation and when he tries to resolve it in 
the Sixth Meditation. In the First Meditation, he sticks to hypothetical reality-
                                                     




replicating dreams. In the Sixth Meditation, he simply rules out the possibility of 
having reality-replicating dreams and sticks to real dreams encountered in daily life, 
which contain bizarre features (that rational beings are able to note). However, as 
shown above, it is not the features of the states that result in the subject making a faulty 
judgment about her current state. It is the absence of the ability to reflect on the actual 
state one is experiencing that results in faulty judgments. Such a reflective ability of 
the subject enables the subject to make a correct judgment about her current state on a 
well-justified basis from the experience, with the assumptions that there are no reality-
replicating dreams and rational beings are able to discern the differences between 
dreams and reality. Such an ability is present in lucid dreaming (where the subject can 
tell she is dreaming) but absent in non-lucid dreaming (where the subject cannot tell 
she is dreaming)10.  
 
From Descartes’s arguments in the Sixth Meditation, that kind of reflective ability is a 
necessary condition for the subject to discern the difference between dream states and 
awake states. In other words, in order to resolve the problem, the condition has to be 
met. However, the occurrence of non-lucid dreaming is a phenomenon where the 
condition mentioned is not met. He does not address non-lucid dreaming at all, where 
such a (full-fledged) reflective ability is absent. As I have shown, we need to show 
both A1 and A2 are unsound, and resolve both the epistemological and the 
phenomenological aspects of the problem, in order to dispel all epistemic threats 
                                                     
10 There are different degrees of lucidity in lucid dreams. Usually lucid dreams are defined as the 
subject being aware of the fact that she is in a dream state. I take that general definition. There is also 
some degree of lucidity in non-lucid dreaming where the subject can think and reason more than we 
assume, but the subject is still unaware of the fact that she is in a dream state (Noreika et al, 2010, p. 
40). Reflective ability of different degree is present in both non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming. The 
ability I have been talking about is the full-fledged reflective ability that enables the subject to realize 





involved. The fundamental difference in features between dream states and awake 
states Descartes mentions can only collapse A1 and resolve the epistemological aspect 
of the problem. The occurrence of non-lucid dreaming remains a challenge for him, 
unless he collapses A2 and resolves the phenomenological aspect of the problem.  
 
Can the concept of imagination resolve the problem? 
Descartes discusses imaginings in the Sixth Meditation. This is believed to be helpful 
in constructing the difference between dream states and awake states.  
 
“I never have believed myself to feel anything in waking moments which I cannot also 
sometimes believe myself to feel when I sleep, and as I do not think that these things 
which I seem to feel in sleep , proceed from objects outside of me, I do not see any 
reason why I should have this belief regarding objects which I seem to perceive while 
awake.” 
(Descartes, 1641/1911, p.27) 
 
He also mentions that a particular effort should be involved in the imagination process. 
That involves a standard conception of imaginings as being an active mental activity, 
as in our general understanding and the usage of the term “imagination”. There is an 
implication behind this conception, namely that the subject’s awareness of the 
imagining state is usually involved, which results in the subject not believing that the 
contents of imaginings stand in any direct causal relations to external stimuli and not 
taking the contents of imaginings to be a source of knowledge about the external world. 
Therefore, we are usually not deceived by our imaginings. That is Descartes’s strategy 




mind and therefore not deceptive in nature. In standard wake states, (rational) people 
will not be deceived by imaginings. That is what I call the awake-state stereotyped 
conception of imaginings, where a higher-order awareness of the actual (imagining) 
state the subject is experiencing is presupposed. Simply using that conception cannot 
resolve the phenomenological aspect of the indistinguishability problem. Non-lucid 
dreaming, where the subject does not have such a higher-order awareness, still remains 
unexplained. The awake-state stereotyped conception of imaginings also features in 
the approaches of McGinn, Ichikawa and Sosa. Following Descartes’s route, they try 
to resolve the awake-dream indistinguishability problem by adhering to such a 
conception. As I will show, their arguments are misguided. They fail to resolve any 
form or any aspect of the problem.  
 
In the following chapter, I will point out the problematic arguments of the imagination 
theorists of dreaming. I mainly pick out two for discussion, which are the sharp 
distinction between percepts and images and the denial of belief in dreams. These two 
are the main strategies McGinn, Ichikawa, and Sosa adopt when they defend the 
imagination view of dreaming. I argue these two ways do not help them resolve but 





CHAPTER 2: The Imagination View of Dreaming 
In this chapter, I point out the fallacious arguments of three contemporary philosophers 
defending the imagination view of dreaming. They are McGinn (2004), Ichikawa 
(2008, 2009), and Sosa (2005). Their main strategies are denying that percepts occur 
in dreams by holding a sharp distinction between percepts and images along with 
denying that beliefs occur in dreams.11 Among the three, Ichikawa holds the strongest 
version, which denies that percepts and beliefs occur in dreams; McGinn denies 
percepts occur in dreams while Sosa denies beliefs occur in dreams. One problem lies 
in the sharp distinction between percepts and images drawn by McGinn and Ichikawa. 
Such a sharp distinction involves what I call the awake-state stereotyped conception 
of images (with the subject’s awareness of the fact that she is in an imagining state), 
which is an obstacle in accounting for non-lucid dreaming (where the subject is 
unaware of the fact that she is in a dream state). The sharp distinction also involves a 
misconception of taking hallucinations to be percepts, which poses a further threat to 
the reliability of perceptual knowledge. I will show that such a sharp distinction does 
not resolve any form or any aspect of the problem. Another problem lies in the denial 
of belief in dreams. It fails to provide sufficient explanatory power of the dream 
experience and begs the question of what constitutes the faulty judgments made in 
dreams. This chapter is divided into two parts, each focusing on one approach: A) the 
sharp distinction between percepts and images and B) the denial of belief in dreams.  
The imagination view of dreaming aims at resolving the awake-dreaming 
                                                     
11 A sharp distinction between percepts and images means they are dichotomously distinct from each 
other by their very nature. Percepts are the products of genuine perceptual experiences. For the 
definition of images, McGinn endorses the picture theory of images while Ichikawa’s account does not 
commit to any theory of images. To avoid confusion, I take what they mean by “images” to be perceptual 
imaginings. Note that I do not hold a sharp distinction between percepts and images. This is an approach 
McGinn and Ichikawa adopt to help prove that dreams are images rather than percepts and thus dreams 




indistinguishability problem. However, none of the imagination theorists of dreaming 
mentioned above explicate the problem before they attempt to resolve it.12 As argued 
in chapter 1, the problem should be interpreted in the form of A1 and A2. The 
imagination theorists are not explicit in showing whether their arguments target A1 or 
A2. There are some clues in Sosa’s arguments. Sosa (2005) thinks A1 is the cause of 
skeptical worries. He thinks A2 does not pose an epistemic threat in a way that matters 
and therefore can be put aside.13 Therefore, it is very likely that his arguments target 
A1. He suggests the problem (A1) can be resolved by the automatic justification of 
wakefulness affirmation. 14  Ichikawa (2008) disagrees. It is unclear whether he 
disagrees because he thinks the problem (A1) cannot be resolved or because he thinks 
it cannot be resolved by the “automatic affirmation” argued by Sosa. In his Dreaming 
and Imagination, Ichikawa (2009) says he partially agrees with Sosa (in that we do not 
form false beliefs in dreams), but it is by no means clear which form of the problem 
his arguments target. 
 
Ichikawa (2009) thinks the orthodox view of dreaming which entails percepts and 
beliefs are present herein is the source of making faulty judgments about one’s current 
state and the basis of the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. He interprets 
the orthodox view as the following: 
 
                                                     
12 They use the term “dream skepticism”, without any definition. I assume it is what I call the awake-
dreaming indistinguishability problem. 
13 I argue this is not the case in chapter 1. 




“Percepts: Dreaming involves percepts—sensory experiences of the sort we 
experience during our waking interaction with the world. These percepts are typically 
misleading; they give us the experience as of perceiving something that is not there. 
Beliefs:  Dreaming involves beliefs—typically false ones. When we dream that p, we 
believe that p. Since in many such cases, p is false, dreaming often involves false 
beliefs.” 
(p. 104) 
The way Ichikawa interprets the orthodox view may give a hint on which form of the 
indistinguishability problem he is addressing. He focuses on faulty judgments made in 
dream states. It makes sense to say his arguments target A2. However, as argued in 
Chapter 1, in order to resolve the problem, we need to collapse both A1 and A2. 
Therefore, when I analyze his arguments, I will see whether they can collapse both A1 
and A2. I will also see whether they can resolve any aspect of the problem. 
McGinn (2004) is not explicit in showing what constitutes the problem. In his 
imagination theory of dreaming, he also rejects the claim that percepts occur in dreams 
by holding a sharp distinction between percepts and images, like Ichikawa. McGinn is 
even more devoted in drawing such a sharp distinction.15 I assume he takes “dreams 
as percepts” to be the basis of the problem. Similar to what I say about Ichikawa’s 
arguments above, McGinn’s arguments seem to target A2, but they should also target 
A1, in order to resolve the problem. Now let us evaluate the sharp distinction 
arguments made by McGinn and Ichikawa. 
  
                                                     




A) The Sharp Distinction between Percepts and Images 
1. Why do they draw a sharp distinction? 
To start with, we need to find out the reason why McGinn and Ichikawa draw a sharp 
distinction between percepts and images and how it relates to the awake-dreaming 
indistinguishability problem, before we judge whether such a sharp distinction is 
useful for resolving the problem. As one of the main approaches of the imagination 
view of dreaming, the sharp distinction between percepts and images is supposed to 
be used to defend this view and resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability 
problem. It should work this way:16 
 
From the sharp distinction between percepts and images to that between percepts and 
dreams:  
P1) There is a sharp distinction between percepts and images. 
P2) Dreams involve images but not percepts. 
C) Therefore, there is also a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams. 
 
How the sharp distinction between percepts and dreams helps resolve the awake-
dreaming indistinguishability problem: 
P1*) If there is a sharp distinction between two states, the subject can distinguish 
between them and tell which state they are currently in. 
P2*) There is a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams. 
P3*) If there is also a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams, there is a sharp 
distinction between awake states and dream states. 
P4*) There is a sharp distinction between awake states and dream states. (modus 
                                                     
16 McGinn and Ichikawa are not explicit in showing how the sharp distinction helps resolve the problem. 





C*) Thus, the subject can distinguish between awake states and dream states and 
tell which state they are currently in. (modus ponens, P4*&P1*) 
 
If the above arguments are sound, the sharp distinction helps resolve the problem: C* 
collapses both A1 and A2 and resolve the epistemological aspect of the problem.17 
This should be the onset purpose of the move. However, I show that according to their 
arguments, P1 is false. The whole argument is unsound and does not help resolve the 
awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem.   
 
2. How do they draw the sharp distinction? 
2.1. Hallucinations as percepts 
McGinn and Ichikawa do not deeply study the nature of percepts and hallucinations 
and take them to be the same, which is misguided. Hallucinations should not be 
regarded as percepts. 
 
McGinn and Ichikawa think hallucinations and percepts have subjectively 
indistinguishable phenomenal characters. 18  However, those are just hypothetical 
hallucinations. When we look at actual hallucinations, hallucinatory and perceptual 
experiences are not necessarily subjectively indistinguishable.19 According to Allen 
                                                     
17 The sharp distinction does not address the phenomenological aspect of the problem. 
18 This is evident in their arguments, which address lower-order hallucinations where the subject does 
not know she is hallucinating and takes hallucinations to be percepts. For example, McGinn (2004) 
writes, “If dreams were hallucinatory percepts, they would generate, or be accompanied by, an 
observational attitude. While (unknowingly) hallucinating a conversation between two people, one will 
find oneself straining to hear better what is being said and orienting one’s eyes so as to gain the best 
possible view” (p. 76). 
19 If two states are subjectively indistinguishable, the subject cannot distinguish between them and 





(2015)’s findings, around half of regularly hallucinating subjects are aware of 
themselves hallucinating. Such a figure is interesting as one cannot draw a unitary 
account of the subject’s cognitive awareness that can be applied to all hallucinations. 
It can be higher-order (that the subject is aware of the hallucinating state and does not 
take it to be a source of perceptual knowledge about the external world); it can also be 
lower-order (that the subject is not aware of the hallucinating state and takes 
hallucinations to be percepts), due to the diversity of hallucinations. There are simple 
and complex hallucinations (Waters et al., 2016). Simple hallucinations like linear 
ones (that do not fit with reality) can be easily realized, if the subject is rational. Even 
though they appear to be received through the senses, it is not true that they are percepts 
due to epistemic impossibility.20 For complex hallucinations where their contents fit 
with reality, the matter is more complicated.  
According to Gibson (1970), a rational subject can tell whether she is perceiving or 
hallucinating in normal circumstances. This implies that percepts and hallucinations 
are not fundamentally indistinguishable and the subject can tell whether they are 
having percepts or hallucinations. A key difference between percepts and 
hallucinations is that percepts are caused externally. An appropriate external stimulus 
has to be present, in order for the experience to be called “perceptual”. Hallucinations 
are not percepts in that hallucinations are caused internally where an appropriate 
external stimulus is absent. Percepts differ from hallucinations in that percepts are 
“explorable, or investigable or susceptible to increased clarity by sense-organ 
adjustment” (ibid., p. 426).21 To tell whether something is a percept or a hallucination, 
                                                     
20 It is impossible for such content to have any corresponding objects in the external world. This may 
be related to our background knowledge. For example, what is possible in reality and what is impossible 
in reality. 
21 That is how he differentiates between percepts and images. He takes hallucinations to be images. 
(This idea is consistent with some psychological definitions of hallucinations which take hallucinations 




one can test via sense-organ adjustment, for example, by closing one eye or moving 
one’s head, to see if there is any “corresponding change of stimulation”.22 If there is, 
it is a percept. If there is none, it is a hallucination.  
Gibson (1970) also addresses lower-order hallucinations. Irrational observers (those 
with diseases or under the influence of drugs) may fail to apply the test to see whether 
there exist external stimuli and end up being unaware of the fact that they are 
hallucinating. However, this does not mean percepts and hallucinations are 
subjectively indistinguishable by their very nature. He thinks the test, if applied, can 
tell whether one is perceiving or hallucinating (imagining) (in most cases). Applying 
Gibson’s account to Allen (2015)’s findings, half of the regularly hallucinating 
subjects do not know they are hallucinating because they don’t or fail to apply the test 
(due to some constraints), not because hallucinations and percepts are subjectively 
indistinguishable by their very nature. The ability to distinguish between them 
involves rationality of the subject which enables her to attend to the experiential 
evidence to make a well-justified judgment. Such a process may involve the subject’s 
background knowledge of the world. For example, flying pigs do not exist (in the 
current world we are living). If we “encounter” a flying pig, provided that we are not 
engaging in any form of fiction (for example watching movies), it is very likely that it 
is a hallucination.23 
2.1.1. The problem of taking hallucinations to be percepts 
The concepts of percepts and hallucinations are intertwined in the sharp distinction 
                                                     
difference also applies to hallucinations.  
22 The target senses should not be closed. For example, if we are testing whether there is any external 
visual input, at least one of our eyes needs to be open, so as to allow reception of external visual signals. 
23 It is also possible that part of it is a percept and part of it is a hallucination. For example, I am really 




arguments of McGinn and Ichikawa. When McGinn talks about the “percept theory”, 
it is unclear whether he is talking about percepts or hallucinations, which I have shown 
to be very different in nature. From the characteristics he uses to draw the sharp 
distinction between percepts and images, the arguments target both percepts and 
hallucinations and fail to resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. 
Hallucinations as percepts, which means hallucinations and percepts are subjectively 
indistinguishable by their very nature, will pose a further epistemic threat where the 
subject may be mistaken in her beliefs about what the external world is like, even if 
she is awake. It fails to dispel the epistemic threat brought by A1 and A2. 
From A1, the subject cannot know she is in an awake state. After collapsing A1, the 
subject should be able to know she is awake. More importantly, she should know she 
is having (genuine) perceptual experiences which inform her of the external world. If 
hallucinations and percepts have subjectively indistinguishable phenomenal characters, 
the subject does not know whether they are encountering percepts or hallucinations. 
They may deny that they are having percepts (when they are actually having percepts). 
They may also take hallucinations to be percepts. This is similar to the epistemic threat 
brought by A1 and A2, just with “dream state” replaced by “hallucinating state” and 
“dreams” replaced by “hallucinations”. 
2.2. Characteristics used to draw the sharp distinction 
McGinn lists a lot of characteristics to sharply differentiate between percepts and 
images. I do not discuss each one of them, due to the limited length of this thesis. I 
pick out some for discussion. Each argument below involves the misconception of 
hallucinations as percepts, which collapses the sharp distinction between percepts and 




collapses even without considering hallucinations. Each argument also implies the 
awake-stereotyped conception of images. 
2.2.1. Active sensory apparatus and information about the surrounding 
environment 
One of the characteristics McGinn (2004) uses for the sharp distinction between 
percepts and images is the role of percepts in informing the subject of the surrounding 
environment: percepts are informative about the surrounding environment while 
images are not. He thinks the active operation of the sensory apparatus gives us 
information about the surrounding environment (ibid., p.80). He says the percept 
theory entails that the sensory apparatus becomes active again during dreaming, which 
he claims to be clearly false. He thinks this is false because: the sensory apparatus is 
not active during sleep and dreams do not inform us of the surrounding environment. 
In fact, the sensory apparatus can be deemed “active” during dreaming. Moreover, it 
does not follow that if the sensory apparatus is deemed active, percepts (and 
information about the surrounding environment) will result. Gibson (1970) uses the 
example of dreaming to illustrate that the perceptual system or what McGinn calls the 
sensory apparatus can be active without yielding percepts:  
  
“in a night dream the inputs of the optic nerves are missing and ocular adjustments, if 
they occurred, would have no effect on the inputs of the optic nerves. Note that, on this 
theory, the rapid eye-movements that accompany night dreams are frustrated efforts of 
the perceptual system to explore an ambient optic array that cannot be sampled because 






Percepts should bear appropriate causal relations with external stimuli. In other words, 
the subject should attend to the external signals and interpret them in an appropriate 
way. Otherwise, percepts do not result. During sleep and dreams, the sensory apparatus 
is actively working and readily receiving (both internal and external) signals. Some 
sense organs, for example eyes, are closed and external stimulation through those 
senses is blocked out. Even if some external signals, for example auditory signals, are 
not blocked out, they are not interpreted in an appropriate way during sleep and 
dreams.24 Therefore, percepts do not result.  
 
When McGinn takes hallucinations to be percepts, he collapses his own sharp 
distinction between percepts and images. From his argument, an active sensory 
apparatus provides information of the surrounding environment. I reckon that the 
sensory apparatus is active during hallucinations, based on Gibson (1970)’s theory, but 
hallucinations do not provide information about the external environment as they are 
generated internally and bear no (direct) causal relations with external stimuli. During 
hallucinations, which often occur in awake states, the hallucinating experience can be 
parallel with the perceptual experience of the subject. 
 
2.2.2. Kind of experience and consciousness 
McGinn (2004) thinks the percept theory is wrong because the same kind of experience 
cannot occur in both awake states and dream states. He draws a sharp distinction 
between percepts and images in terms of the nature of experience concerning 
consciousness. He uses three arguments to show that. The first argument concerns 
                                                     
24 During sleep and dreams, the body is at rest. The mind is not actively interpreting the external signals 
and directing the body to respond in an appropriate way. If the signals are intensive, for example: a fire 
alarm is going off, the resting state of the body may be disrupted and the subject may wake up. If the 
signals are soft, for example: people are whispering, the body may remain in sleep and dreams. Dream 




percepts’ causal role in one’s awakening, with Ichikawa arguing along the lines. The 
second argument concerns the ability of ending one state with another kind of state. 
The third argument concerns the brain-in-a-vat experiment. I will show all of them are 
misguided.  
 
2.2.2.1. The casual role of percepts in one’s awakening 
McGinn (2004) writes, “How can I start having the very same type of experiences, 
subjectively considered, during unconscious sleep that I have while awake and 
conscious? Wouldn’t the onset of such experiences wake me up?” (p. 80) 
 
The last claim involves a problematic argument similar to Ichikawa’s in the causal role 
of percepts. 
 
2.2.2.1.1. Ichikawa’s puzzling argument on the causal role of percepts 
Among his arguments to differentiate between percepts and imagery, Ichikawa (2009) 
writes,  
 
“When I am asleep, a loud noise will typically wake me up. My phone rings, and my 
sleep is interrupted. The obvious explanation for the causal power of that phone is that 
it causes auditory experiences-percepts-and those percepts cause me to wake up.” 
(p.108).  
 
He uses this argument to show that dreams are not percepts but imagery. The argument 





P1) Percepts can cause one to wake up from sleep. 
P2) Images cannot cause one to wake up. 
P3) Dreams do not cause us to wake up. 
P4) Dreams involve either percepts or images. 
C) Thus, dreams involve images rather than percepts. 
 
It is ambiguous how he takes percepts to be the cause of one’s awakening. (I reckon it 
makes sense to say percepts are the direct cause of awakening in his argument.) 
According to Locke (2016), “A percept is something which exists only in so far as it 
is perceived...These sense-dependent percepts might also be said to be mental, in the 
sense that they have no spatial location, and private, in the special sense that can be 
perceived by only one person, the person whose percept it is.” (p.20) 
If percepts are mental, there may be no crucial difference in the causal roles between 
percepts and images in one’s awakening. Even if there is, it is by no means obvious. 
One cannot take it for granted without trying to explicate the difference. Moreover, 
percepts are supposed to be caused by external objects and therefore the cause of one’s 
awakening shall be ultimately external, but Ichikawa denies such an external cause. 
 
“Perhaps she will suggest that it is not my auditory experience that wakes me, but the 
sound waves hitting my ear. Such alternate explanations do not strike me as 
particularly plausible.” (Ichikawa, 2009, p.108) 
 
Such an argument is puzzling to me. It is unlikely that he takes percepts to be external 
but he does not explicate the difference between percepts and mental images in their 




no explanation is needed but I do not think so. I think one’s awakening can be caused 
internally or externally (subject to empirical studies though): 
 
1) Caused internally: awakened from a dream (e.g. a nightmare) where emotions 
are so intense that sleep is interrupted 
2) Caused externally: awakened by the external environment, for example, a 
change in temperature, a (considerably loud) noise, or an abrupt change in 
one’s physical position (e.g. falling off one’s bed, being pushed forcefully…), 
etc. 
 
It is unlikely that Ichikawa refers to the first case mentioned (awakening caused 
internally) and it is perplexing that he refers to the second case but denies external 
causes. I think he should define percepts to give a clear account of the difference 
between percepts and images, as well as the difference between their causal roles in 
the related respect. He should explain why percepts are the direct cause of awakening 
and why such an internal cause is not applicable to images. He should also account for 
the first case and the difference between the two cases in terms of causal relations, 
which I believe to be a very difficult (or even implausible) task if one does not allude 
to external causes. 
 
2.2.2.1.2. The problem of the causal role of percepts in one’s awakening 
McGinn and Ichikawa are misguided in what wakes the dreaming subject up. The 
ambiguous account of percepts and the allusion to their causal role in one’s awakening 
to percepts are misleading. McGinn’s claim that the onset of perceptual experiences 




argument above.25 The cause of one’s awakening can be internal or external. If the 
cause of awakening is internal, it is the internal signals generated within the body 
(regardless of the external environment) that cause the dreaming subject to wake up. 
If the cause of awakening is external, it is the external signals that wake the subject up. 
This kind of process is physiological, as opposed to the mental process of percepts. 
Whether the cause of awakening is internal or external, it is not percepts that cause the 
dreaming subject to wake up because the necessary condition of percepts, namely that 
the subject interprets the external signals in an appropriate way, is absent in the 
dreaming subject.  
 
If the cause of awakening is external, then there may come a question: under what 
circumstances will a dreaming subject be woken up by an external stimulus? 
According to Gibson’s theory, the sensory apparatus is active during dreaming and 
therefore the body is readily receiving inputs from the surrounding environment. When 
will the external inputs successfully stimulate the subject to wake up from sleep (or a 
dream)? This is an empirical issue. The salient point is that it is misguided to claim 
percepts cause one to wake up while dreams do not for arbitrary or unclearly clarified 
reason.  
 
Moreover, if McGinn and Ichikawa take hallucinations to be percepts, hallucinations 
should also have the same causal role as that of percepts in one’s awakening, according 
to their arguments. This is by no means clear. If the cause of awakening is external, 
                                                     
25 I assume what McGinn means by “perceptual experiences that wake one up” is “percepts that wake 
one up”, like the way Ichikawa argues, but McGinn does not deny external causes like Ichikawa does, 
at least not in an explicit way. McGinn does not construct the details of such an argument. It is just one 
sentence. If he denies external causes in one’s awakening, his argument has the same problem as 
Ichikawa’s; if he does not deny external causes, he is misguided in the causal role of percepts in one’s 
awakening. Whichever way he argues, it is misguided to use “percepts wake one up” to sharply 




hallucinations do not wake one up as such external causes are absent in hallucinations. 
If the cause of awakening is internal, it is not absolutely clear that it is hallucinations 
that cause the awakening. It is misguided to draw a sharp distinction between 
hallucinations and images in terms of their causal role in one’s awakening. The sharp 
distinction between percepts and images in terms of their causal role in one’s 
awakening collapses anyway. 
 
2.2.2.2. Ending one state with another  
Besides the misconstrued casual role of percepts (and hallucinations) in one’s 
awakening, McGinn (2004) goes on arguing for the claim that the same kind of 
experience cannot occur during awake states and dream states:  
 
“Suppose I have taken a drug and am hallucinating liberally; I want to put an end to 
this state of mind, so I try to go to sleep. Don’t I succeed if I do go to sleep? Doesn’t 
sleep precisely put an end to sensory hallucination, as it does to ordinary veridical 
perception? It’s not that I merely replace one type of hallucination with another. But 
the percept theory cannot accept this piece of common sense, since it takes sleep to be 
just the beginning of exactly the same type of state of consciousness.” (P.81)   
 
The argument can be construed in the following form: 
P1) When I hallucinate, I can end the hallucination by going to sleep.  
P2) We can end a state with another state only if they involve different types of 
consciousness. 
P3) If dreams, which occur during sleep, are hallucinations, I cannot end hallucinations 




P4) I can end hallucinations by going to sleep. 
C) Therefore, dreams are not hallucinations.  
 
This is not a sound argument. First, he presupposes awake states are a necessary 
condition of hallucinations, like the case of percepts: If you perceive, you are awake. 
If you are not awake, you do not perceive.26 Taking hallucinations to be percepts, so 
it follows that: if you hallucinate, you are awake; if you are not awake, you do not 
hallucinate. This is not true, at least not deductively, for awake states are not a 
necessary condition of hallucinations: unlike percepts, which requires the senses to be 
open to receive external signals, hallucinations, which are not caused by an external 
source, do not need to receive external signals and therefore the senses are not required 
to be open (theoretically). Second, he holds that awake states and dream states do not 
involve the same kind of experience, namely that awake states are conscious states 
while dream states are not. What he means by consciousness is vague. Does 
consciousness mean the ability to think? Or just simply being awake? If he means the 
latter and uses that to justify the claim that dream states are not conscious states, this 
is just an awake-state stereotyped conception. Simply taking consciousness to be 
wakefulness and presupposing the same kind of consciousness cannot occur in both 
awake states and dream states is not a comprehensive account of consciousness and is 
an unfair treatment of dreaming.27 If he means the former, then it is wrong to say 
dream states are not conscious states, as it is shown that the dreaming subject is able 
to think and reason in both non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming (Noreika et al., 
2010). This whole argument is misguided. 
                                                     
26 Perceptual experiences require the senses to be open to actively interpret the external sensory inputs. 
If the subject is not awake, perceptual experiences do not take place as the external signals cannot be 
interpreted.  





2.2.2.3. The brain-in-a-vat argument 
Another argument McGinn (2004) uses to defend the claim that the same kind of 
experience cannot occur in both awake states and dream states is the brain-in-a-vat 
argument:  
 
“When the perpetually hallucinating brain in a vat goes to sleep, there is a change in 
its state of consciousness; life is not one long dream to this subject of consciousness. 
The dreaming brain in a vat is in a different state of consciousness from the waking 
(but hallucinating) brain in a vat.” (p.81) 
 
McGinn takes a hallucinating brain in a vat to be “a waking brain in a vat”. The reasons 
behind are: he takes hallucinations to be percepts and presupposes awake states are a 
necessary condition of hallucinations, which I have already shown to be false. It is 
misguided to take hallucinations to be percepts and think awake states are a necessary 
condition of hallucinations. It is also misguided to think a hallucinating brain in a vat 
entails “a waking brain in a vat” and take a hallucinating brain in a vat to be “a waking 
brain in a vat”.  
The brain-in-a-vat argument is traditionally used to question the reliability of 
perceptual knowledge, namely beliefs about the external world. The argument is as 
follows: 
 
If I know that p, then I know that I am not a brain in a vat. 
I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. 





where p is a proposition about what the external world is like. 
 
This argument poses a challenge to the whole knowledge system about the external 
world by showing that if one cannot rule out the possibility that one is a brain in a vat, 
beliefs regarding what the external world is like may end up being false.28 Here it is 
very important to distinguish between wakefulness and hallucinations, since there is a 
significant difference between “a waking brain in a vat” and a hallucinating brain in a 
vat which leads to a different interpretation of the brain-in-a-vat experiment. “A 
waking brain in a vat” may involve the possibility of knowing one is a brain in a vat 
and therefore restoring the reliability of perceptual knowledge but a hallucinating brain 
in a vat does not involve such a possibility. Moreover, it is not necessary to differentiate 
between a hallucinating brain in a vat and a dreaming brain in a vat as the nature of 
experience is more or less the same (where no perceptual knowledge results). However, 
under some condition there is a significant difference between “a waking brain in a 
vat” and a dreaming brain in a vat.  
If it is a disembodied brain in a vat, it is not of much value to differentiate between “a 
waking brain in a vat” and a dreaming brain in a vat, as there is no significant difference 
in the nature of the experiences in terms of consciousness and the yielding of 
perceptual knowledge. 29  There are no perceptual organs and no perceptual 
experiences, let alone perceptual knowledge.30 The brain in a vat is doomed to be 
deceived, if the subject comes to believe she is perceiving. If it is an embodied brain 
                                                     
28 If you are a brain in a vat, you are stimulated by a supercomputer to have experiences which are 
qualitatively indistinguishable from genuine perceptual experiences, from the first-person perspective. 
If you come to believe you are really perceiving any external object, you are mistaken. 
29 Actually the term “waking” should be avoided as the senses are absent. It is nonsensical to say the 
brain is awake when the body is absent. 




in a vat, there are two possible cases: embodied but without connection to senses; 
embodied with connection to senses. For the former case, there is no significant 
difference between the two brains in a vat in question in terms of consciousness and 
the yielding of perceptual knowledge, just like the case of disembodied brains in a vat. 
For the latter case, “a waking brain in a vat” means the subject’s senses are open as it 
is nonsensical to claim the subject is awake and the senses are not open.31 In that case, 
what is the difference between a “waking brain in a vat” and a dreaming brain in a vat? 
A waking brain in a vat means it is possible for the subject to know she is a brain in 
vat because she can perceive and test what she seems to perceive is what she really 
perceives, according to Gibson’s theory of perception.32 The subject may not or fail 
to apply the test, and is completely deceived. However, it is possible for a waking brain 
in a vat to realize she is a brain in a vat and perceptual knowledge is possible, if awake 
states and dream states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. The possibility of 
perceptual knowledge, which comes from percepts, is the key difference between a 
waking brain in a vat and a dreaming brain in a vat (or a hallucinating brain in a vat). 
Such a possibility is not involved in a dreaming brain in a vat or a hallucinating brain 
in a vat.  
 
As argued above, a hallucinating brain in a vat is not the same as and does not entail a 
waking brain in a vat. A hallucinating brain in a vat is not necessarily in a different 
state of consciousness from that of a dreaming brain in a vat in terms of consciousness 
                                                     
31 I doubt whether this is possible. At least this is not how the brain in a vat experiment is usually 
presented. If it is an embodied brain in a vat, it is usually construed as the senses being closed where 
the subject does not respond to external stimulation in the same way as when they are awake. 
32 This is true only if dream states and awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. The active 
perception theory does not collapse the brain in a vat argument as it cannot rule out the possibility that 
one is a brain in a vat, if the images generated by the supercomputer can be identical to percepts. If 
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, even if the subject can perceive, it 
is impossible for him to tell whether something is really a percept or not based on the available evidences 




and the yielding of perceptual knowledge. Whether it is a disembodied brain in a vat 
or an embodied brain in a vat, the nature of the experience is more or less same: no 
perceptual knowledge results. If the subject believes she is perceiving, she is doomed 
to be deceived. One may question whether it is possible for a hallucinating brain in a 
vat to be awake? In other words, can a brain in a vat be both hallucinating and waking? 
The answer is yes (if a waking brain in a vat is possible) as hallucinating and perceptual 
experiences can be parallel. There are two interpretations of a waking but hallucinating 
brain in vat. The first one is: perceptual and hallucinating experiences are 
indistinguishable. That poses a great threat to perceptual knowledge. In that case, there 
is no significant difference between the brain in a vat discussed and a dreaming brain 
in a vat in terms of consciousness and the yielding of perceptual knowledge as no 
perceptual knowledge results. The second one is the subject fails to or does not carry 
out the test. However, in that case, the significant difference between the brain in a vat 
discussed and a dreaming brain in a vat, namely the possibility of perceptual 
knowledge, comes from percepts but not hallucinations.33 Using the term “a waking 
but hallucinating brain in a vat” is just confusing and does not pinpoint the key 
difference between the brains in a vat concerned. It just further worsens the epistemic 
threat. McGinn’s brain-in-a-vat argument is misguided and does not help draw the 
sharp distinction between percepts and images. 
 
2.2.3. On the observational attitude 
McGinn (2004) thinks hallucinations and percepts involve an observational attitude of 
the subject while images do not. He gives an example of a lower-order hallucination. 
 
                                                     





“While (unknowingly) hallucinating a conversation between two people, one will find 
oneself straining to hear better what is being said and orienting one’s eyes so as to gain 
the best possible view.” 
(ibid., p.76) 
 
It is unclear what an observational attitude exactly means. Is it necessarily associated 
with outward behavior (and the object of observation being external)? 34 Can the 
content of observation be mental and internal? If the content of observation can be 
mental and internal, it is questionable whether percepts always involve an 
observational attitude and images do not. Whether I observe something or not depends 
on my interest. If I am interested (in the content), I will observe. Otherwise, I will not. 
This applies to both percepts and images. Using “observational attitude” to sharply 
differentiate between percepts and images in this sense is misguided. If observational 
attitudes have to be associated with behavior and the object of observation cannot be 
internal, then the notion of “observational attitude” should not be applied to 
hallucinations because hallucinations are internal,35 but he does so. Therefore, the 
sharp distinction also fails in this sense. 
 
In addition, this sharp distinction is at risk of reaching a contradiction with another 
sharp distinction that McGinn (2004) makes, namely that images are attention-
dependent while percepts are not (p.78-79). If percepts are not attention-dependent, 
they do not always involve an observational attitude; if percepts always involve an 
observational attitude, they are attention-dependent.  
                                                     
34 I hold that if observational attitudes are necessarily associated with outward behavior, the object of 
observation should be external. Otherwise, the action is insane. 
35 There is no corresponding external stimulation and there is nothing to observe, if the content or object 





2.2.4. Saturation and recognition 
McGinn (2004) claims that images can have unfilled parts but it is not the case of 
percepts and hallucinations. He claims that images are attention-dependent: parts 
which we are interested in and attend to are filled; parts that we are not interested in 
and do not attend to are unfilled and unspecified. To him, percepts do not work that 
way. Every point of the sensory system is filled and we judge the identity of the object 
we perceive from the sensory inputs. As appearances can be deceiving, the judgment 
made can be fallacious, but it is not case with images. There is no such fallibility 
because “knowledge of the objects of imagining is not so based”, “it derives rather 
from stipulation, from the underlying intention”. (ibid., p.83) He claims that the 
recognitional process of identity knowledge is only present in perceptual experiences 
but not in imagining experiences, but the way he presents his argument for the image 
theory shows such a recognitional process is also present in images. 
“This account also accommodates something that the percept theory has great trouble 
explaining: how we can know the identity of our dream objects even when their 
appearance is grossly distorted.” 
(ibid., p.83) 
 
To him, we “just know” the identity of the object of imagining, not from any inferences. 
 
“I once had a dream about a woman whose face was really only filled in around the 
mouth area (large red lips), the rest of the face being left pretty much blank (I knew 





From the above quotations, we can see he claims there is knowledge of identities of 
the objects of images. That means the above claim “I know who she is” is true, which 
I argue to be false.36 
 
For the sake of clarity, I rewrite the claim: from “I know who she is” to “I know she is 
y”.37 The claim that “I know she is y” involves a proposition about a person in the 
external world: “she is y”. “She” denotes a person.38 “I know she is y”, if true, entails 
knowledge of the identity of a person. Knowledge of identity of a person entails that 
the proclaimed identity of that person is correct. In order for that to be true, there must 
be an actual person who is the corresponding reference of “she” and that person must 
be y. It is impossible to have knowledge of the identity of a person if that person (in 
the external world) is not the corresponding referent. Therefore, the first condition for 
“I know she is y” to be true is that person y must be the corresponding referent of “she” 
(a correct identity). The second condition is that the judgment (she is y) is made on a 
well-justified basis from a perceptual experience where there are appropriate causal 
relations from which the subject derives the judgment “she is y”.39  
 
It is misguided to claim “I know she is y” in the context of (pure) imagination because 
there is no way for this claim to be true over imaginings. First, as shown above, the 
proposition “she is y” is a proposition about a person in the external world where “she” 
denotes a person. In that sense, there must be an external stimulus for this claim to be 
true in the very beginning. Such a direct external cause is absent in imaginings. What 
                                                     
36 For the sake of simplicity, I change the tense and delete the adverbial phrase of the original claim. I 
assume that does not alter the meaning in a way that matters. 
37 “I know who she is” and “I know she is y” have the same meaning. 
38 Sometimes “she” is used to refer to a non-person like a country, vehicle or other inanimate thing. In 
the original phrase “who she is”, “who” refers to a person, so “she” also refers to a person in this context. 




“she” actually means in the above claim is just the content of imagination where there 
is no external corresponding reference. “Who” and “she” should not be used to refer 
to the content of imagination. Moreover, we should not say “there is knowledge of the 
identity of the object of imagining” as “identity” and “object” also have allusion to 
external objects. It is nonsensical to say there is knowledge of the identity of the 
content of imagination when the external allusion brought by identity is absent. The 
concept of identity knowledge is irrelevant to imagination.  
 
It is misguided to derive beliefs about what the external world is like from the content 
of imagination. If the judgment of the claim that “I know apples are red” is derived 
from pure imagination, then the claim is false. This does not constitute knowledge 
because this claim is not made on a well-justified basis. 40  This judgment is all 
internally caused. States caused internally do not give knowledge about what the 
external world is like. In this case, it just happens to be the case that apples are really 
red. It is like you happen to have true beliefs by luck or coincidence. Luck and 
coincidence does not constitute knowledge. Imagination, which is not caused by an 
external stimulus, cannot give us knowledge about what the external world is like.  
 
Is there knowledge of the content of imagination? In other words, should we apply the 
concept of knowledge to the content of imagination? Is it the case that there is no 
fallibility in “knowledge” about the content of imagination: I just know what I imagine 
simply by introspection, like what McGinn claims? It is not absolutely clear whether 
there is knowledge of the content of imagination. This can be controversial. I do not 
                                                     
40 For this claim to be made on a well-justified basis, the primary condition is that there must be 
perceptual experiences. “Apples are red” is a proposition about the external world. For “I know apples 




attempt to deal with it and I think I do not have to now. If there is knowledge of the 
content of imagination, there will be truth conditions for the content of imagination, 
sticking to the definition of knowledge I have been using. Then it is possible that these 
truth conditions are not met and it is possible that we form a faculty judgment over 
what we imagine. We cannot be sure we are right about our what we imagine simply 
by introspection, given that introspection can be unreliable. I do not agree with 
McGinn that there is no fallibility in the knowledge of the content of imagination (if 
there is any) acquired by introspection. 
 
The way McGinn puts it “no fallibility in knowledge of the identity of the object of 
imagining”, is misguided in three ways. First, knowledge of identity of objects alludes 
to an external sense, which is irrelevant to imagination. Second, even if there is 
knowledge of the content of imagination, it does not grant that we never form mistaken 
judgment about what we imagine. The way he presents his arguments collapses his 
sharp distinction between percepts and images in terms of recognitional characters of 
the experiences. Moreover, hallucinations, which he takes to be percepts and therefore 
should have recognitional characters in experience, do not have external causes and 
therefore do not have recognitional characters in experience.41 The sharp distinction 
between percepts and images also collapses in this sense.  
 
2.2.5. On concurrent imagery 
McGinn (2004) believes percepts can be accompanied by concurrent (and disparate) 
imagery but it is not the case of images (p.77-79).42 He thinks that percepts and images 
                                                     
41 Recognitional characters are applicable to perceptual experiences only where there are external 
corresponding references. 
42 He thinks: percepts are not attention-dependent and therefore the mind can wander from its percepts 
into forming a mental image; in contrast; images are attention-dependent and the mind cannot wander 




do not compete with each other. They can take place at the same time “except in the 
case in which they have the very same content”. This is an interesting point to discuss. 
It is not absolutely clear whether percepts and images of the same content can take 
place at the same time. If this is possible, such a case further supports the claim that 
percepts and images fall on a continuum. When percepts and images of the same 
content take place at the same time, can one tell whether it is percepts or images that 
catch one’s attention? One may allude to different causal relations. Percepts are caused 
by external stimuli and images are caused internally. However, such processes occur 
simultaneously and it is difficult for the subject to differentiate between the two 
processes. In this case, they may have quite inseparable experiential characters relative 
to the subject.43 This shows that a sharp distinction between percepts and images is 
misguided. McGinn defends his sharp distinction argument by implying that percepts 
and images of the same content cannot coexist. In the case where percepts and images 
have the same content, they may compete. Either percepts or images win. If percepts 
win, percepts are attention-dependent and no concurrent image can be formed. This 
contradicts his claim that percepts are not attention-dependent and a concurrent image 
can be formed. If images win, it means that you can choose to attend to images and 
refrain from perceiving. This contradicts his claim that percepts are passive and 
uncontrollable. 44  Both ways collapse the sharp distinction between percepts and 
images that he draws.  
 
                                                     
43  Gibson’s account of perception: when you inspect the object, if it reveals details or appears 
differently with varying viewing positions, it is a percept. In that case, it is still possible to differentiate 
between percepts and images, even if they have the same content, at least in principle. The question 
arising will be: can percepts and images of the same content take place at the same time? The Perky 
experiment (1910) shows that it is possible to mistakenly take percepts to be images with the same 
content. The participants thought they were imagining but not perceiving. Can it be the case that they 
were actually imagining and perceiving the same content at the same time? The answer is not obvious.  
44 If percepts are uncontrollable, the subject cannot choose to refrain from perceiving a particular 




Moreover, it is questionable whether we can have one image only at a time, according 
to the way he argues. He claims that only one image can be formed at a time because 
it fully occupies our attention and involves effort. Voluntary imaginings may take up 
full or explicit attention because effort is involved in producing such imaginings. 
However, what about involuntary imaginings? When we do not actively put effort into 
producing them and when they are unpleasant and therefore not welcome, is it 
necessary to pay full or explicit attention to it? Can the subject make an effort to 
imagine a nicer image and try to dismiss the unpleasant involuntary one? In doing so, 
is it possible to have concurrent images? What about spontaneous imaginings without 
the subject’s (conscious) effort in producing them? Can we have deliberate and 
spontaneous images at the same time? It is not absolutely clear that whether it is 
possible to have more than one image at the same time, according to the way he argues, 
where he sticks to voluntary imaginings. For imaginings with the subject’s awareness 
of the actual imagining state, it seems that it is hard to imagine a situation where more 
than one image can be formed at the same time. However, it is unclear whether there 
cannot be concurrent images, if we have lower-order imaginings where the subject 
does not know the actual imagining state and therefore take the imaginings to be 
percepts. To the subject, the imaginings are no different from percepts. In that case, 
can the subject have more than one image at a time? In other words, can lower-order 
imaginings and higher-order imaginings take place at the same time? The answers to 
these questions are by no means obvious. Moreover, our imagination may be dynamic 
and borderless. It is hard to judge what constitutes one image and what means by 
concurrent images. Imagination is an internal and introspective process where the 
ability to access the exact content is limited. We may never know whether we form 




as I do not think it helps defend the sharp distinction or the imagination view of 
dreaming. 
 
2.2.6. Subjection to the will 
Among the characteristics McGinn (2004) lists to sharply differentiate between 
percepts and images, the only one that Ichikawa (2009) explicitly endorses is “subject 
to the will”. I argue that “subjection to the will” arguments do not help draw the sharp 
distinction and do not help defend the imagination view of dreaming.  
 
Ichikawa thinks “the will” captures the key difference between percepts and images. 
McGinn argues along the same lines with him. According to them, images involves a 
process of actively doing, is subject to the will and therefore can be controlled while 
percepts involves a process of passively receiving, are not subject to the will and 
therefore cannot be controlled. Control plays an important role in their sharp 
distinction. 
 
Percepts as “passively receiving” is actually an old-fashioned view on perception. It 
has been argued that perception is not as passive as assumed.45 Perception is an active 
seeking-process to search for what one wants to perceive, to select among the 
indefinitely large number of external objects and to select on which part of the scene 
to focus. In that sense, one cannot deny that percepts are also subject to the will and 
amenable to control, to a certain degree.  
 
Ichikawa (2009) concedes we may still be able to exert control over what we perceive 
                                                     




but the control can only be indirect, as opposed to direct control over images. Thomas 
(2014) finds the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” control confusing. He 
claims that one can just find ways to attend to what one wants to perceive. For instance, 
if I want to see a cat, I can make an effort to find a cat and bring it in sight. When I see 
a cat, I can choose to which part to attend, actively seeking to test whether what I seem 
to see is really what I see.46  
 
In addition, it is not the case that we can always control our imaginings. It is not 
difficult to find examples of (spontaneous) involuntary imaginings in our daily life, for 
example, an annoying tune or unpleasant images in head which we want to get rid of 
but fail to do so. It seems that control is not a necessary condition of imaginings. This 
forms the general challenge of the whole conception of imagination: If imagination is 
subject to the will, it should be amenable to control. Why is there a gap between the 
will and control (as in the examples of involuntary imaginings)?47 In that case, what 
is the necessary condition of imaginings? Subjection to the will? How can we tell 
whether something is subject to the will if we cannot control it? Ichikawa (2009) 
argues that “the fact that sometimes we imagine things we’d rather not be imagining 
does not show that imagining is not an action and subject to the will” because “we can 
try to banish it; we know what it is to banish” (p.107). From these two sentences, it 
makes sense to say Ichikawa takes subjection to the will to be a necessary condition 
                                                     
46 In my opinion, both percepts and images can be controlled, in terms of their contents, in a slightly 
different sense though. They differ in terms of the subject’s ability to alter the content without any 
adjustment of the perceptual organs. I can will to see but I cannot will to alter the content of what I see 
without moving because percepts are caused by external stimuli and therefore the content of percepts is 
bound by the external world. I cannot alter every bit of the content as I wish in my mind like what I can 
do when I imagine. We control percepts in order to realize more information about the external world 
while we do not control images in the same way. Images, caused internally, do not give us knowledge 
about what the external world is like.  
47 I do not attempt to provide an answer here, given the limited length of this thesis. Another project is 




of imaginings and he thinks self-awareness of the imagining state is the key to telling 
whether something is subject to the will.48 
 
Images are subject to the will. 
How to tell whether something is an image? It is subject to the will. 
How to tell whether something is subject to the will? Self-awareness of the imagining 
state.49 
This argument is not helpful in defending the claim that something is an image, when 
it is not clear that whether it is an image. When you are not sure whether something is 
an image, it is not convincing to say it is an image because you know it is. It is unclear 
whether you really know it. Maybe it is just the case you think you know it. The claim 
“I know it is an image” can be false. Moreover, it seems to threaten the reliability of 
knowledge (if there is any) if we do not provide any reason to justify that claim but 
simply say I know... We should provide reasons to justify this claim: how we come to 
“know” it (if we really know it). For example, we “know” it is an image because of its 
fictional content, sudden shift of scenes and amenability to control. This justification 
process is absent in Ichikawa’s argument. He just jumps to the self-awareness of the 
imagining state. This does not help defend that something (to be proved as an image) 
is an image. The concept of the will is usually alluded to the self-awareness of the 
imagining state. Such an argument does not help defend the imagination view of 
dreaming as such self-awareness is absent in non-lucid dreaming.  
                                                     
48 This means the subject is aware that the process which generates such content is internal (where there 
is no direct causal relation with external stimuli). That is a higher-order awareness which enables the 
subject to know the actual state she is currently experiencing. This is an introspective process, which 
can be unreliable. 
49 That is the awake-state stereotyped conception of imaginings-self-awareness of the imagining state. 
It is not absolutely clear how the subject comes to be aware that it is an image. Ichikawa (2009) 
comments “many of the characteristics McGinn lists as typical of images…are not clear cases of 






If we claim that dreams are images and subject to the will, the first challenge we may 
face is: why we cannot control (non-lucid) dreams. 
 
Control is not possible in non-lucid dreaming. Even if control is possible in lucid 
dreaming, the extent of control is limited. This does not favour the imagination view 
of dreaming.50 
 
As shown above, it is not the case that we can always control images, even in awake 
states. That shows that control is not a necessary condition of images and subjection 
to the will. Using the absence of control or the limited extent of control to deny dreams 
are images is not legitimate. However, it is justified to ask why dreams are images, if 
we cannot control non-lucid dreams. This leads us to go back to the question of how 
we can tell whether something is subject to the will if we cannot control it. Ichikawa’s 
answer is irrelevant and does not help because the proclaimed self-awareness is absent 
in non-lucid dreaming. 
 
Then in what way are we justified in alleging that dreams are images? 
 
McGinn (2004) is aware of the problem of non-lucid dreaming, where self-awareness 
of the fact that one is in a dream state is absent. He writes,  
 
“dreams do not appear to be subject to the will: we do not decide what to dream, but 
instead occupy the role of passive recipient.” (ibid., p.88)  
                                                     
50 Windt (2015) claims that the ability to control the content is much repressed in lucid dreams than in 





He goes on defending the imagination view of dreaming by trying to resolve the above 
problem, 
 
“It would be wrong to suppose that the sleeper is entirely passive, a complete non-
agent; sleeping and acting are not incompatible. Thus we have sleepwalking and sleep-
talking, adjustments of posture to avoid discomfort, small movements seemingly 
correlated with the content of the dream.” (ibid., p.88-89) 
 
Is it really useful to claim that the sleeper is active by quoting examples of bodily 
behavior? Recall the previously mentioned claim made by McGinn and Ichikawa: 
percepts are sharply differentiated from images in that percepts involve a process of 
“passively receiving” while images involve a process of “actively doing”. The key role 
that the notion of “actively doing” plays in the sharp distinction is: it involves effort in 
producing and also the possibility of altering the content without any sense-organ 
adjustment.51 The whole process is mental. Sticking to bodily behavior is not helpful 
in arguing for such an “activeness” as the sense of bodily activeness is different from 
the sense of mental activeness. Unless McGinn draws some relations between these 
two senses and shows that bodily activeness can help argue for mental activeness, the 
argument on behavior does not help argue that dreams are images. 
 
Another way McGinn (2004) argues, trying to defend the imagination view of 
dreaming: 
“Since we could always declare subjection to the will not to be a necessary condition 
                                                     





of image-hood. Maybe it holds for all waking images, but the images of sleep are 
different; they are simply a species of image that cannot be voluntarily controlled.” 
(P.88) 
 
From the above quotation, there are three points to note. First, subjection to the will 
not being a necessary condition of images means that there is at least one (kind of) 
image that is not subject to the will. This collapses the sharp distinction he draws: 
images are subject to the will while percepts are not. Second, when he claims that 
dream images are different from awake-state images, is it still legitimate to use the 
features of awake-state images to support the claim that dreams are images (like what 
he and Ichikawa do) without bridging the gap in a proper way? Last but not least, he 
holds that dream images cannot be voluntarily controlled. This is false and involves a 
problem of overgeneralization. The kind of dreaming he is addressing in the above 
quotation is non-lucid dreaming. There is also lucid dreaming, where the dream 
content can be controlled.52 He does mention lucid dreaming somewhere. 
 
“And there are also clear cases in which dreams can be subject to the will: we have all 
had the experience of intentionally terminating a nightmare when it becomes too 
emotionally intense, and the rarer phenomenon of ‘lucid dreams’ allows for voluntary 
control over the full course of the dream.” (McGinn, 2004, P.89) 
 
There are different degrees of lucidity in lucid dreams (Noreika et al., 2010). Lucid 
dreams do not necessarily mean one can exert control over the full course of the dream. 
Compared to waking (voluntary) images, the extent of control over the dream content 
                                                     





is limited. Lucid dreamers do not necessarily control every bit of the dream content as 
they wish. Lucid dreams only entail that the dreamer is aware of the fact that he is in 
a dream state.53 McGinn does not draw detailed relations between non-lucid dreaming 
and lucid dreaming. He just mentions lucid dreaming as a rare phenomenon. That does 
not help defend the imagination view of dreaming.  
 
From the above quotation, he means:  
 
Control entails subjection to the will.  
Control is possible in lucid dreaming.  
Dreaming can be subject to the will. 
 
There is a problem in this argument. “Dreams can be subject to the will” does not mean 
all dreams are subject to the will. It is unclear what kind of dreams are subject to the 
will and what kind of dreams are not. It makes sense to say lucid dreams are subject to 
the will. What about non-lucid dreams? Unclear. Nothing follows from this argument 
over the question of whether non-lucid dreaming is subject to the will or not. In other 
words, this argument does not show that all dreams are subject to the will and thus are 
images. That does not help defend the imagination view of dreaming as non-lucid 
dreams, which are the main challenge the imagination view of dreaming faces, are not 
addressed in a proper way. 
 
McGinn is mixing up the issue of control and subjection to the will. He should not 
have put: 1. “we could always declare subjection to the will not to be a necessary 
                                                     




condition of image-hood” and 2. “dreams can be subject to the will”. What follows 
from 1 & 2: there exist images that are not subject to the will. The sharp distinction 
between percepts and images collapses and it does not help resolve the problem. He 
should have claimed that (successful) control is not a necessary condition of “image-
hood” (what I argue above). He should maintain that all images are subject to will. 
Otherwise, subjection to the will is not useful for him to draw a sharp distinction, to 
defend the imagination view of dreaming and resolve the awake-dreaming 
indistinguishability problem.54  So far, the kind of images McGinn and Ichikawa 
discuss are high-order images, namely what they call awake-state images, where the 
subject is aware of the fact that she is in an imagining state. It is unclear whether there 
exists any image which is not subject to the will and whether there is any image that 
is not amenable to control. I personally think there is none. Images are caused 
internally. Given this nature, images should be amenable to control. We may fail to 
control it but its nature should grant its amenability to control. Can we exert control 
(alter the content without any sense-organ adjustment) on something which is not 
subject to the will? So far I have not been able to think of any example. I hold that 
control (over the content without any adjustment of the sense-organs) is not a necessary 
but a sufficient condition of subjection to the will and subjection to the will is a 
necessary condition of the so-called “image-hood”.55 For involuntary images, they are 
still subject to the will and therefore amenable to control. It is just the attempt to control 
is somehow unsuccessful.56 
 
                                                     
54 If all images are subject to the will, they are amenable to control (but no successful control is 
guaranteed). In other words, control is possible. That can explain why something which does not appear 
to be subject to the will can be controlled, as in dreaming. If not all images are subject to the will, there 
is difficulty bridging the gap between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming and it is difficult to defend 
the imagination view of dreaming and resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem.  
55 The term “image-hood” is used by McGinn. It means perceptual imaginings here. 




Although many of his arguments are fallacious (as shown above), McGinn is very 
devoted to explaining the dreaming phenomenon. As a closing of this part, let us see 
how he explains the absence of one’s awareness of his own dream state.  
 
2.2.6.1. “Psychic split” 
McGinn uses a psychological concept to explain non-lucid dreaming: psychic split. He 
divides the self into an author-self and an audience-self, trying to explain why 
dreamers are not aware of their dream states. The author self is the hidden agent 
producing the dream and the audience-self is unaware of such an agent and receives 
what is given to her by the author self. He uses this concept to claim that “dream 
images are the product of an unconscious will. If that is so, then dream images are not 
counterexamples to the necessary condition of subjection to the will. All images are 
subject to the will, after all, but this may not be apparent to the consciousness of their 
recipient.” (McGinn, 2004, P.90). 
 
First, the audience metaphor is not entirely convincing. “Audience” implies that the 
subject is aware of the “stage”. If I watch a play, I know the actors are performing. I 
can tell the fictional events are not real events happening and as a result will not believe 
the fictional events. However, this is not the case of non-lucid dreamers. They are not 
aware of the fact that they are in a dream state and believe the dream events. The gap 
between non-lucid dreamers and the audience metaphor remains unfilled. The 
audience metaphor is more akin to lucid dreaming where the subject is aware of the 
fact that she is in a dream state and does not believe the dream events. He claims non-
lucid dreamers are fully immersed audiences who believe the dream events. Why this 





The psychic split does not directly show that dreams are subject to the will in any 
obvious way. He needs to elucidate why “dream images are products of an unconscious 
will”, namely to prove why dreams are subject to the will. Just suggesting the psychic 
split but not relating it to lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming accordingly does not 
help defend that dreams are images. He should address both lucid and non-lucid 
dreaming and draw the connection between them in order to argue that dreams are 
products of imagination.  
 
The use of the psychic split is along the same lines of the Freudian approach. But 
McGinn (2004) does not agree with Freud in the question of why there is such a 
psychic split: 
 
“Why is there such a psychic split? Freud’s answer is that it is because the unconscious 
contains dark and dangerous desires that must be repressed for the stability of the entire 
psyche.” (p.91) 
 
He does not endorse such a negative account of human nature.  
 
“It is not that we are afraid of the unconscious, as Freud would have it; rather, we have 
an urge to believe what we merely fantasize.” (ibid., p.92) 
 
He tries to provide his own answer to that question. 
 




belief and its associated emotions. For some reason, we have a need to believe during 
the dream, and this requires the illusion of passivity. Why this is so I am not sure, but 
it does seem to be the case” (ibid., p.91) 
 
His answer does not really answer the question. Paving way for dream belief is not 
exactly why the psychic split occurs. Rather, it is how the psychic split occurs or can 
be like. The underlying reason for the occurrence of the psychic split remains 
unanswered. This may be the key element to bridge lucid dreaming and non-lucid 
dreaming, which helps defend the imagination view of dreaming. This most important 
part is omitted and his account is incomplete. He should try to provide an answer in 
order to make his account complete and plausible, so as to favour the imagination view 
of dreaming. If this is not done, the psychic split will only be an ad hoc argument which 
fails to explain non-lucid dreaming and disfavor the imagination view of dreaming. 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
Let us recall how the sharp distinction between percepts and images should work, in 
order to help resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem:  
 
From the sharp distinction between percepts and images to that between percepts and 
dreams: 
P1) There is a sharp distinction between percepts and images. 
P2) Dreams involve images but not percepts. 
C) Therefore, there is also a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams. 
 




dreaming indistinguishability problem: 
P1*) If there is a sharp distinction between two states, the subject can distinguish 
between them and tell which state they are currently in. 
P2*) There is a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams. 
P3*) If there is also a sharp distinction between percepts and dreams, there is a sharp 
distinction between awake states and dream states. 
P4*) There is a sharp distinction between awake states and dream states. (modus 
ponens, P3*&P2*) 
C*) Thus, the subject can distinguish between awake states and dream states and 
tell which state they are currently in. (modus ponens, P4*&P1*) 
 
The sharp distinction between percepts and dreams means there is at least one 
fundamental difference between percepts and dreams. If there is a fundamental 
difference between percepts and dreams, the subject should be able to distinguish 
between them and tell whether she is in an awake state or dream state. This points out 
that these two kinds of states are not fundamentally indistinguishable, which resolve 
the epistemological aspect of the problem. It shows that P1 of both A1 and A2 are false. 
After resolving the problem, the subject should be able to come to be aware of the fact 
that she is in an awake state when she is awake; she should also be able to come to be 
aware of the fact that she is in a dream state when she is dreaming. However, the sharp 
distinction fails because of the following reasons: 
 
(a) McGinn and Ichikawa take hallucinations to be percepts. 
(b) Their arguments stick to higher-order images (with the subject’s self-





What follows from (a) and (b): 
(a) collapses the sharp distinction between percepts and images and therefore the sharp 
distinction between percepts and dreams. If P1 is false, the argument is unsound and it 
does not follow that C is true. It does not follow that P2* is true and C* is true either. 
The sharp distinction no longer helps resolve the problem: it can collapse neither A1 
nor A2 and it fails to resolve any aspect of the problem. The salient point of collapsing 
A1 and A2 is to restore the reliability of perceptual knowledge. If hallucinations are 
percepts, this means hallucinations and percepts have (subjectively) indistinguishable 
phenomenal characters. In that case, the subject cannot be sure what kind of experience 
their beliefs are derived from and it is very likely she forms a mistaken judgment over 
what are percepts and what are hallucinations. The epistemic threat (brought by both 
A1 & A2) persists. It poses a further epistemic threat: even if the subject is aware of 
the fact that she is awake, it is very likely that she forms mistaken judgments and no 
perceptual knowledge results. It is misguided to take hallucinations to be percepts. It 
just worsens the problem. 
 
The sharp distinction is made with reference to awake-state images with the subject’s 
self-awareness of the imagining state. The self-awareness of the imagining state, what 
I call the awake-state stereotyped conception of imaginings makes the arguments 
inapplicable to non-lucid dreaming and is not helpful in accounting for non-lucid 
dreaming. (b) is not helpful in arguing that dreams are images because such self-
awareness is absent in non-lucid dreaming. It does not follow that P2 is true and it does 
not follow that C is true. In that case, it does not follow P2* and C* are true either. It 





To conclude, the sharp distinction drawn by McGinn and Ichikawa is misguided, is not 
helpful in defending the imagination view of dreaming and fails to resolve the awake-







B) The Denial of Belief in Dreams 
In this part, I evaluate another main approach of the imagination view of dreaming, 
the denial of belief in dreams, adopted by Ichikawa and Sosa, to see if it can help 
resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem. Both Ichikawa (2009) and 
Sosa (2005) think we have a lot of beliefs in dreams but we do not actually believe 
what we dream: we believe that p in our dreams but do not actually believe that p while 
we dream.57 They deny that dream beliefs are beliefs. First, in terms of terminological 
concern, “dream belief” literally implies belief. If Ichikawa and Sosa do not think 
dream beliefs are beliefs, they should avoid using the term “dream belief”, which is a 
cause of conceptual confusion. Second, the distinction between “in one’s dream” and 
“while one dreams” or “in fact” implies that perceptual experiences are while dream 
experiences are not actual experiences. This involves an awake-state stereotyped 
conception of belief as being perceptual and functional, which hinders a fair study of 
the dream experience and dream beliefs. Third, the denial of belief in dreams is an ad 
hoc approach and does not help resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability 
problem. 
 
1. The reasons for Ichikawa and Sosa to deny belief in dreams: 
1.1.The functional role of belief 
The main reason for Ichikawa (2009) and Sosa (2005) to deny belief in dreams is due 
to the functional role of belief: belief involves a functional role which is “connected 
with perceptual experiences” and “motivates action” (Ichikawa, 2009, p. 114). 
According to their argument, the functional role of belief is closely connected to action 
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 Sosa (2005) distinguishes between “in one’s dream” and “while one dreams” (p. 8). Ichikawa (2009) 




or behavior. For example, if I believe I am chased by a lion, I will keep running (away 
from it) (Sosa, 2005, p. 8). This is the functional role of typical perceptual beliefs, 
which govern our action by giving an appropriate response to the signals we get from 
experiences. One of the reasons that they deny belief in dreams is: dreamers do not act 
according to their dream content, based on observation (Ichikawa, 2009, p. 115). 
Observation plays an important role in Ichikawa and Sosa’s argument, which implies 
that belief can be inferred by observing one’s action or behavior. However, can all 
beliefs be inferred by observing one’s action or behavior? If there are beliefs which 
cannot be inferred by observing one’s action or behavior, it is not legitimate to deny 
that beliefs occur in dreams due to the the lack of observable action or bodily behavior 
generally in sleep.  
 
1.1.1. Can all beliefs be inferred by observing one’s action or behavior? 
Imagine a case: Sarah has been kept in a closet since birth. She has never come out to 
interact with the world. She learns about how people react to different stimuli, namely 
how people feel and what they do in different situations, on books. For instance, if a 
person thinks he is about to be stabbed, he will fear and try to escape. When he is 
stabbed, the person will feel great pain. If a person feels great pain, his face will 
grimace, he will collapse, and so on. Sarah has no idea about what fear and pain feel 
like. Now she has a chance to come out of the closet and interact with the world. She 
happens to be stabbed by a psychopath. Before she is stabbed, she does not feel 
anything different from how she felt in the closet. After she is stabbed, she keeps 
bleeding, but still she does not feel anything different from how she felt in the closet. 
In other words, she cannot feel fear and pain. She remains still, doing nothing. People 




an experience is deviated from the norms and she is thought to be weird or even “a 
monster”. In order to survive within the social circle, she has to hide the fact that she 
does not feel fear and pain. Next time when she is about to be stabbed, she pretends 
she feels fear and tries to escape. When she is stabbed, she pretends she feels pain by 
screaming with a grimaced face and collapsing, not in pain but in pretense of being in 
pain. People think she believes being stabbed is a fearsome and painful experience, 
but in fact she does not. This is a case of pretense, which shows that action does not 
always carry a corresponding belief we anticipate and it is possible that we cannot infer 
belief from action.  
 
The very same action can carry a different belief or different beliefs. Let us consider a 
case where a man kills his wife: Man a may kill his wife because he believes his wife 
betrays him; Man b may kill his wife because he believes it is better for his wife to die, 
for her own good (for example, she is suffering a severe chronic disease which puts 
her in great pain every day); Man c may kill his wife because he believes she is 
possessed by an evil spirit which wants to kill him; Man d may kill his wife because 
he believes his wife betrays him and he can get a lot of money from the insurance 
company if his wife is dead, et cetera, et cetera. It is unlikely to be possible to draw a 
complete list of beliefs that one action shows. There can be a wide variety of different 
beliefs behind the very same action among different people. There can be more than 
one belief behind a particular action within the same subject. There can be a lot of 
completely different situations in which one does a particular action. If we do not any 
have background information of the subject, it can be hard to find out the belief or 






Moreover, it is unlikely we are always right about what actions follow from a belief if 
we do not have the background information of the subject. 
Consider a case: Sharon and Sally are twins. They do not grow up together. Sharon is 
raised in Angel Village while Sally is raised in Devil Village. The tradition of Angel 
Village is to treat good people with love and care while that of Devil Village is to torture 
good people. If Sharon and Sally believe that there is a good person in front of them, 
Sharon will treat him well while Sally will torture him. This case shows that the very 
same belief may yield completely different actions. What action follows from a belief 
may vary among different cultures, living environments and values, and these factors 
may vary with time. It is unlikely that there is only one (kind of) action following a 
belief. Thus, a belief does not entail a particular action or an action profile. It is also 
unlikely to make a list of actions as a complete set of a necessary condition of a belief 
(belief p  action x, y, z…) or as a complete set of necessary conditions of a belief 
(belief p action x or y or z…), given the diversities of factors affecting action.58 It is 
unlikely to be possible to draw a complete list which applies to all times, cultures, 
living environments and values. If we do not know about the background information 
of the subject, his response to a particular belief (in the form of action) can be 
unpredictable. 
Moreover, degrees of belief might shift and it is possible that there are actions 
conflicting with professed beliefs (Rowbottom, 2016). It further shows that it seems to 
be impossible to draw a complete list of actions following from a particular belief. 
It is not true that we can always infer belief by observing one’s action. There are some 
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a belief has to be accompanied by all actions included in the set. The list of actions as a complete set of 
a necessary condition of a belief (belief x  action x, y, z…) is even less probable due to the 
implausibility of manifesting one belief in the form of all actions (on the list) together at the same time 




beliefs which cannot be inferred by observing one’s manifest action or behavior. It is 
neither true that we can always anticipate particular action(s) following a belief. This 
shows that it is misguided to deny belief in a particular experience (for example, 
dreaming) because corresponding action cannot be observed. 
      
1.2. Belief and fact 
Another reason for Sosa and Ichikawa to deny belief in dreams is that dream events 
are not actual events (facts) and therefore dream beliefs are not actual beliefs.  
 
“Even if in my dream I believe that a lion is after me…in actuality I have no such 
belief…From the fact that in my dream I am chased by a lion it does not follow that 
while I dream I am chased.” (Sosa, 2005, p. 8) 
 
“In my dream, I have many beliefs: in my dream, I believe that I am holding the 
kitten…This alone does not entail beliefs; all parties grant that in the dream I believe 
these things; in dispute is whether in fact I believe them… Compare: in the dream I 
am holding a kitten; it does not follow that in fact I am doing so.” (Ichikawa, 2009, p. 
111) 
 
From the above quotations, we can see that Sosa and Ichikawa draw a close connection 
between events and beliefs. They use the radical difference between dream events and 
actual events to help impose a radical difference between dream beliefs and actual 
beliefs and thus deny that dream beliefs are beliefs. Denying that dream beliefs are 
beliefs due to the reason that dream events are not actual events (facts) is not legitimate. 




events only. It may imply an undesirable outcome: drawing too close a connection 
between belief and fact. This sets an unnecessarily high standard for belief. Fact, by 
its very meaning, is always true. However, this is not the case of belief.59 Obviously 
we can form false beliefs. When do we form false beliefs? We form false beliefs when 
we do not know they are false, under two kinds of circumstances: 1) the subject fails 
to attend to the evidence which tells they are forming false beliefs, 2) when there is no 
evidence for us to judge whether our beliefs are true or false.60 Let us focus on the first 
kind of circumstances first. Under this kind of circumstances, there is evidence 
available to the subject which tells them that they are holding false beliefs. One may 
wonder why the subject still forms false beliefs in this case. This kind of circumstances 
illustrate cases where the subject is not in a rational state and fails to attend to the 
evidence, as in the case of patients with mental disorders. For example, schizophrenic 
patients cannot tell what is really happening and what is hallucination or imagination, 
when they are overcome by the disorder. There are clues to tell whether the content is 
a hallucination or a percept but they are just not aware of the clues.61 They form false 
beliefs regarding what the world is like.  
 
Now let us look at the second kind of circumstances where one forms false beliefs. 
Consider a case of limited experiential evidence available: If we are a brain in a vat 
and doomed to be deceived by an evil scientist, we form false beliefs about what the 
external world is like. In fact, all beliefs regarding what the external world is like are 
false because the experiential evidence available for us to form beliefs is all provided 
by the scientist who blocks out all evidence which tells that we are in a virtual reality 
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this is a necessary condition of knowledge.) However, beliefs themselves are not necessarily true. 
60 If we know they are false, we will not hold them anymore. That is what a rational subject should do. 
61 Percepts and hallucinations (or imagination) can be differentiated by sense-organ adjustment. More 




and forming false beliefs. Although we are rational and intend to find out the truths 
about our environment, we fail because we have no access to the evidence which tells 
the truth.  
 
The above examples show that we may form false beliefs and beliefs are not truth-
based. Moreover, we can form beliefs with content which is hard to know whether it 
is true or false. There are a lot of things we do not or cannot know, for example, 
whether there are ghosts, aliens, and ufos, to name but a few. We can still believe in 
the existence of those things. Belief is not necessarily based on what we know. We can 
form false beliefs, and beliefs which are hard to (we do not) know to be true or false. 
It is misguided to allude belief to facts and use that as a reason deny that dream beliefs 
are beliefs.  
 
1.3.Inconsistency between long standing beliefs (knowledge) and dream beliefs  
Both Sosa and Ichikawa think if dream beliefs are beliefs, there will be inconsistencies 
between long standing beliefs (those held during awake states) and dream beliefs, 
which does not make sense. For example, I hold the belief that pigs do not fly in awake 
states but I may dream that pigs fly in dream states. If dream beliefs are beliefs, our 
knowledge system will be threatened because of the epistemic irrationality of holding 
p and not-p at the same time. The trick here lies at “at the same time”. If we do not 
hold p and not-p at the same time, can we avoid the epistemic threat? How about this 
approach: long standing beliefs are temporarily suspended during the dream period? 
In that case, it is not the case that we hold both p and not-p at the same time and there 
is no inconsistency between long standing beliefs and dream beliefs. Ichikawa does 




beliefs drastically and wholesale” (Ichikawa, 2009, p.112). Sosa thinks along the same 
lines. He thinks that our beliefs do not necessarily rise to our consciousness at every 
moment. He calls beliefs which do not come to our consciousness “latent beliefs”. 
Although those beliefs are in storage, not rising to consciousness, they are not lost 
during sleep and the dream period. Normally we do not need to revise our belief system 
with conscious effort. When the dreaming subject form (dream) beliefs which are 
obviously inconsistent with those long-standing beliefs, she should be able to note it 
and dispel those (dream) beliefs. Otherwise, it is a kind of epistemic irrationality, 
which is a cause of epistemic threat and not preferred. 
 
The way they construe the threat is misguided. They stick to the awake-state 
stereotyped conception of belief as being functional and perceptual and interpret dream 
beliefs in the form of perceptual beliefs, which are usually the building blocks of 
knowledge. If dream beliefs are building blocks of knowledge, they will pose a great 
epistemic threat to our knowledge system. However, I argue that this is not the case. I 
will show that dream beliefs are not building blocks of knowledge and do not threaten 
perceptual knowledge. Even if the subject believes the content of imagination, there is 
not necessarily an epistemic threat, or a pressing threat. In order avoid confusion, I 
interpret dream belief in the form of “I believe that I imagine that p”,62 rather than “I 
believe that p” (interpreted by Sosa and Ichikawa), in order to show dream beliefs do 
not cause as pressing an epistemic threat as Sosa and Ichikawa think. 
 
For any perceptual belief “I believe that p”, the truth value of p determines the truth 
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does not necessarily involve the subject’s reflective awareness of the fact that she is in an imagining 
state while the former does. For the latter case, the subject may form mistaken judgment about her 




value of the belief: if p is true, the belief or the claim is true; if p is false, the belief or 
the claim is false. However, this is not the case of the claim “I believe that I imagine 
that p”. Here p is the content of imagination and should not be taken to be information 
about the external world. If p is a proposition about what the external world is like, its 
truth value lies in an external sense, which is irrelevant to imagination.63 The truth 
value of p does not determine the truth value of the claim “I imagine that p” and 
therefore it does not determine the truth value of the claim “I believe that I imagine 
that p”.64 Moreover, I may not know what I imagine introspectively.65 However, that 
does not pose a threat to the reliability of perceptual knowledge about what the external 
world looks like, as long as we can know we are imagining when we are really so.  
 
One key advantage of my approach is that it can account for the emotional response of 
the dreaming subject and does not threaten the reliability of general perceptual 
knowledge about the external world. In the dream case, the subject can be aware or 
unaware of the dream or imagining state.66 In lucid dreaming, the subject believes that 
she imagines that p while in non-lucid dreaming, it can be said that the subject 
imagines that p without being aware of the fact that she is imagining. Generally 
speaking, if the subject is aware of the fact that she is in an imagining state (provided 
that she is rational), she is aware that such a belief is not a building block of knowledge 
about the external world. If the subject is unaware of the imagining state, she is 
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64 Consider the proposition that pigs fly. This proposition is false, but it does not follow that I cannot 
imagine that pigs fly.  
65 There seems to be no way of finding the exact content of imagination. Scientific data can at most tell 
whether we are in an imagining state or not but the content of imagination seems to rely on our 
subjective interpretation. There seems to be no correctness but only plausible explanation over what we 
imagine. It is questionable whether the content of imagination fits the criteria of knowledge, given the 
uncertainty of mental content. Even if there is, I doubt whether the whole justificatory process can be 
done introspectively, for introspection can be unreliable. 
66 My account here involves an assumption of taking dreams to be imaginings. I will show why we 




unaware that such a belief is not a building block of knowledge and may form a 
mistaken judgment. In this case, she may have a stronger emotional response towards 
the dream events. The subject may be unaware of the difference between p and 
imagining that p. She may think she is believing p but in fact, she is imagining p 
without being aware of the fact that she is in an imagining state. One may worry if this 
causes a pressing epistemic threat. I argue that this is not the case. Non-lucid dreaming 
does not pose a threat to the general knowledge system, as the subject can be aware of 
the fact that she is imagining or dreaming.67  
 
It is reasonable to ask why the subject is unaware of the imagining state, as in the case 
of schizophrenia. The answer is that mental disorders strip them of their rationality. 
How about the dream case? Why is the same person rational during awake states but 
irrational during dream states?  Does it makes sense? I am not giving a detailed 
explanation (which I attempt to provide in chapter three) here. The salient point here 
is that such an approach-“I believe that I imagine that p” in dreams- does not cause a 
threat to perceptual knowledge and it is possible to resolve the awake-dreaming 
indistinguishability problem.  
 
The way Sosa and Ichikawa construe this argument, contains obviously inconsistent 
beliefs, for example, “pigs do not fly” (long-standing belief) and “pigs fly” (dream 
belief). “Pigs do not fly” is a general or universal fact which rational people should be 
able to acknowledge. As pigs do not fly, the belief that pigs fly should be dispelled, 
rationally speaking. A general or universal fact is true any time (sticking to the current 
world we are living where it is true), independent of the subject’s state. However, we 
                                                     




do not always dream about content which is inconsistent with general or universal facts. 
For example, if we dream about getting up from bed and getting ready for school, is 
there any belief inconsistency?68 Sosa will say yes: I cannot be in bed and getting up 
preparing for school at the same time. However, unlike general facts, the belief that I 
am in bed is not always true. Whether it is true or not depends on my state: when I am 
in bed, it is true; when I am not, it is false. When I am asleep having a false awakening 
dream, I may easily dispel the belief that I am in bed, for it is not always true. This 
kind of belief which is relative to the subject’s state shows that it is not belief 
inconsistency that essentially points out the problem. Rather, the problem lies at the 
subject’s being unaware of the fact that she is in a dream state. Such unawareness does 
not necessarily result in inconsistent beliefs which cause a serious epistemic threat 
claimed by Sosa and Ichikawa. It is misguided to interpret dream beliefs in the form 
of perceptual beliefs regarding general or universal facts and construe a pressing 
epistemic threat in the form of inconsistency between long-standing beliefs and dream 
beliefs.  
      
1.4. Moral responsibility 
Ichikawa and Sosa draw a close connection between belief and intention.69 They think 
that while dreaming, the subject does not really intend and she is “not responsible in 
the slightest” (Sosa, 2005, p.10; Ichikawa, 2009, p.113). They suppose that denying 
moral responsibility in dreams helps defend the denial of belief in dreams, which I 
show to be misguided. According to their argument, intention is the key to judging 
whether one is morally responsible. However, the main reason for denying moral 
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responsibility is that the subject needs not do what she dreams in actuality (ibid.). This 
leads us to think whether it is action or intention that is the underlying factor we need 
to consider while making moral judgment.  
 
First, intention is a mental concept and does not necessarily entail action. I can intend 
to do something but fail to do so for some reason. Observing one’s action is not 
sufficient for making a full moral judgment. Consider a case: William was raised by 
his mother in a single-parent family. His mother always abused him in his childhood. 
He understands it was extremely difficult for his mother to raise a child on her own 
and does not want to blame her. He wants to give her a better life, as a gratitude to her 
for raising him in difficult circumstances. However, he has also formed hatred towards 
her and sometimes blames her for the traumatic memories of childhood abuse which 
still have negative impacts on his life now. Sometimes he intends to give his mother a 
better life but sometimes he also intends to torture and kill her. Every time when he 
intends to torture or kill her, he is stopped from doing so by his intention to protect his 
mother. He never succeeds in torturing and killing his mother but he does intend so 
sometimes. No one knows of such an intention except himself. What people (including 
William’s mother) see is William treating his mother so well. It shows that observing 
one’s action is not sufficient for making a full moral judgment, for some action may 
not be observed. The action carried out will show the intention directing that action, 
but it is not essential or adequate for making a full moral judgment. For example, if 
people see William treating his mother so well, they may think he is praiseworthy. 
However, they do not know his evil intention of torturing and killing his mother, which 
is to blame. Intention does not necessarily entail action: I can intend to do x but fail to 




agent. Whenever he intends to kill, the agent stops him from acting in the very 
beginning. He never kills but always intends to kill. Isn’t he blameworthy?  
 
It is not the case that we can always infer intention from observing one’s action and 
make a full moral judgment based on observing one’s action: I can intend to do 
something but fail to do so; the fact that that I do something does not entail I intend to 
do as such. I have already given examples to show the former case. Now I give an 
example to illustrate the latter case. Imagine that Alan is controlled by an evil demon. 
He is made to kill his beloved wife. He does not intend so at all. He loves his wife so 
much and does not want to see his wife die, but he just cannot control his body. Alan 
is made to pick up a gun and shoot his beloved wife, against his will. The killing action 
does not necessarily show a killing intention. I think it makes sense to say the evil 
demon, rather than Alan, is the one to blame. Now we see that action and intention do 
not bear any inseparable relation. If we grant that intention is the key factor to be 
considered while making moral judgment, there is a problem: sometimes it can be hard 
to judge whether one has a particular intention, given the uncertainty of mental 
content.70 
Sosa also agrees that observing one’s action is not sufficient for making (a full) moral 
judgment. He claims that if your body is paralyzed and cannot carry out your evil plan, 
you are still to blame (Sosa, 2005, p.9). It makes sense to say intention itself, 
independent of action, is the cause of blame, according to Sosa’s argument. If a brutal 
killer is paralyzed and cannot kill, he is blameworthy if he still has the intention to kill. 
He may imagine how to torture and kill but cannot implement his plans due to physical 
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constraints.71 According to Sosa’s argument, he is blameworthy for the content of his 
intended plan or imagination. Now that killer receives some kind of hypnosis treatment 
where he does not consciously imagine anything evil. His evil desires or intentions are 
deeply buried under his consciousness. When he is awake, he unknowingly suppresses 
those desires. When he falls into sleep, such ability to suppress the evil desires ceases 
to work. Those evil imaginings arise again in his dreams. In his dreams, he imagines 
exactly the same way he did before the hypnosis treatment. Now is he blameworthy? 
If it is the content of intention or imagination that is morally responsible, I do not see 
any reason why he is not morally responsible in dream states. Those desires are always 
there. They are just suppressed during awake states. His evil intention or imagination 
just moves from awake states to dream states. If he is to blame during awake states 
(before the hypnosis treatment), I do not see any reason why he is not blameworthy in 
dream states, given the content of intention is exactly the same. 
 
Sosa says that whatever the dream content is, the dreamer is not morally responsible. 
However, if he grants that dreams are products of imagination, the above case is at 
least in principle possible.72 In that case, the dreamer is blameworthy for the dream 
content. He claims that there is a difference between the dreamer and the dream 
content- we may blame the storyteller for telling such a story but we do not blame the 
dream characters for what they do in the dream (Sosa, 2005, p. 9). Is such a difference 
of much value, in terms of moral responsibility? I do not think so. If dreams are 
products of imagination and the author is the dreamer, what the dream characters do is 
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72 I am not trying to say dreams are carriers of one’s intention. I just want to point out that if there are 
cases where the border between intention and imagination is blurred, it is misguided to set up a sharp 




all designed by the dreaming subject. If intention, which is mental and independent of 
action, is the key factor in judging whether someone is morally responsible and it is 
possible that it cannot be differentiated from imagination, one cannot deny that the 
dreamer can be morally responsible for the dream content to a certain degree. We do 
not blame the dream characters do for what they do in the dream but do blame the 
dreamer for what she dreams about, namely what the dream characters do in the dream, 
if we apply the concept of moral responsibility to dreaming. Simply claiming that the 
subject does not really intend in dreams and therefore is not morally responsible is ad 
hoc. The limited access to mental content calls into question that whether we really 
know we intend or not. Sometimes the border between imagination and intention is 
blurred, as shown in the above case of the paralyzed killer. It is by no means 
uncontroversial to deny moral responsibility in dreams, if we take dreams to be 
products of imagination. Denying intention and moral responsibility in dreams does 
not help argue for the denial of belief in dreams or the imagination view of dreaming. 
  
2. Can the denial of belief in dreams resolve the awake-dreaming 
indistinguishability problem? 
2.1. The epistemological aspect of the problem 
The key to resolving this aspect of the problem is to show that awake states and dream 
states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. Sosa argues that we always know we 
are in an awake state when we are really so. He says awake states can be automatically 
affirmed by questioning whether I am awake: if I think, I am awake. This, if true, can 
resolve the epistemological aspect of the problem and collapse A1. 
 
To start with, Sosa (2005) use an analogy between death and dreaming to show that 




dreaming are unconscious states. Unconscious states do not threaten knowledge of 
conscious states, for the subject is unable to tell she is unconscious when she is 
unconscious. The subject is able to question whether he is conscious only if he is 
conscious. If he asks whether he is conscious (awake), he must be conscious (awake). 
The judgment that one is conscious (awake) cannot be mistaken. He thinks dreams are 
like death and do not cause epistemic threat. This is not so convincing as there is a 
significant difference between death and dreaming: a dead person is unconscious but 
a dreaming subject is not unconscious, at least not unconscious in the same sense as a 
dead person. A dead body is not working anymore. It cannot receive any external 
signals. It cannot generate any internal signals either. It is unconscious in any sense. 
However, that is not the case of dreaming. The body of a dreaming subject is working, 
at a minimal level though.73 It still receives external signals, even though it does not 
actively interpret the signals in the same way as it does during awake states. More 
importantly, there are internal signals.74 If you take consciousness to be the ability of 
actively interpreting external signals or even having perceptual experiences, then you 
may say the dreaming subject is unconscious. If you allow consciousness to be the 
ability to be aware of the internal signals in a particular sense, then the dreaming 
subject can be said to be conscious.75 Whether the dreaming subject is conscious or 
not may be a matter of terminological concern here, but the difference between a dead 
person and a dreaming subject is more than a terminological concern. A dead person 
does not pose any epistemic threat but a dreaming subject can.76 As a dead body is not 
working physiologically or mentally, it is uncontroversial to say a dead body does not 
                                                     
73 For details, see chapter 2a. 
74 This is shown by the working of the body to sustain life such as heartbeat. The occurrence of 
dreaming further shows internal signals are generated. 
75 For example, the subject is conscious of the dream state in lucid dreaming. The subject can also be 
said to be conscious of the dream content in non-lucid dreaming, just with some mistaken judgment. 




hold any belief. However, that is not the case of a dreaming subject, whose body is 
working both physiologically and mentally. Belief is a mental concept. It is not 
uncontroversial to claim the dreaming subject holds or does not hold any belief. It 
makes sense to raise the question of whether I am in a dream state or not,77 but it does 
not make sense to ask whether I am dead or not, for the state in question itself shows 
or alludes to the inability to ask such a question.   
      
Ichikawa (2008) also thinks there are some important features of dreaming which 
distinguish it from death: First, dreaming is an experience but death is not. Dreaming 
is an experience where “there is something it is like to dream”. Second, dreaming is 
“in an important way” similar to being awake in terms of sensation and belief. 
Dreaming, comprising imagery and propositional imagination, plays some roles of 
visual sensory experiences. The considerable similarity between awake states and 
dream states makes it sensible to worry whether I am currently being awake or 
dreaming but the insufficient similarity between awake states and death does not 
ground such worry. One cannot affirm one is awake just by reflection ignoring the 
possibility of making a false judgment (ibid., pp.522-523) 
 
Ichikawa uses an example to illustrate that: 
      
“Rip sleeps, and dreams, twenty hours out of every day. His dreams are very 
compelling: upon waking, he is invariably surprised to learn that the events of his 
dream were not actually occurring. Sometimes, when he is awake, he reflects on how 
                                                     
77 Sosa (2005) thinks that does not pose a threat as the dreaming subject does not really wonder whether 
she is dreaming or not. Rather, she just dreams she is wondering. This is ad hoc. Wondering is a mental 
process and it can be consistent with dreaming. In other words, the dreaming subject can wonder 
whether she is dreaming or not, in principle. It is misguided to draw a sharp distinction between 




often things turn out to be just dreams, and he wonders whether his current experiences 
are dream experiences; he sees no way to tell, other than to wait and see whether he 
eventually wakes up.” 
      
(Ibid., p. 522) 
      
Ichikawa uses this example to show that if awake states and dream states are 
fundamentally indistinguishable (as illustrated in the example), the subject cannot 
distinguish between them. When there is no way to tell the difference between these 
two kinds of states, clearly reflection does not help the subject correctly judge the 
current state she is in. In the above case, Rip just happens to have true beliefs about 
his current state. They are not formed on a well-justified basis from the experiential 
evidence because there is no evidence marking any difference. It is an ad hoc approach 
to claim that the judgment of awake states by reflection cannot be wrong and Rip is 
“safe from the dream scenario”. This is not sufficient to grant knowledge and dispel 
the epistemic threat. 
 
Under what circumstances can one tell she is in an awake state? According to what I 
argue in chapter one, there has to be at least one significant difference between awake 
states and dream states which the subject is able to discern (with the assumption that 
she is rational). In other words, they do not have (fundamentally) indistinguishable 
experiential characters, namely identical (experiential) content. Otherwise, they are 
fundamentally indistinguishable and one cannot tell she is in an awake state on a well-
justified basis from the experiential evidence. Sosa holds a different view. He thinks 




in an awake state when he is really so. If that is true, even in the case of brain-in-a-vat 
where the super computer can generate experiences that have identical experiential 
content as that of perceptual ones78, the subject can still differentiate between those 
experiences (dream states and awake states) and tell he is awake when he is really so 
(assuming it is possible for the brain-in-a-vat subject to be awake). That is not 
convincing to me. When there is nothing the subject can discern, it is impossible in 
principle for him to distinguish between awake states and dream states on a well-
justified basis. Recall that knowledge is undefeated true justified belief. Reflective 
knowledge refers to the knowledge of one’s current state based on available 
experiential evidence, which is only possible when there is a discernible difference 
between these two kinds of states to the subject and the subject is aware of the 
difference, plus the ability to tell which state she is in on a well-justified basis. If there 
is no discernible difference between two states, no matter how hard the subject reflects 
on her current state, finding evidence which tells which state she is in, she just cannot 
know her current state because there is no such evidence available for her to reflect on. 
The subject can never form true beliefs about her current state on a well-justified basis 
from the experiential evidence. She may happen to form a true belief about her current 
state but such a belief (true by luck) does not constitute knowledge. Reflective 
knowledge can help distinguish between awake states and dream states only if they do 
not have identical experiential content and are not fundamentally indistinguishable.  
 
Ichikawa (2008) thinks “rational affirmations are based on sound treatment of 
available evidence”, not on guarantees of non-inaccuracy. He uses the example of safe 
barn in fake barn country to illustrate that. 
                                                     
78 But in fact those experiences are not perceptual ones because of the lack of appropriate causal 




      
“Henry is driving around in fake barn country, where most of the barn‐like things are 
fake barns; he sees a bunch of things that look like barns. He picks out one barn‐like 
thing, and says to himself That's a barn. The thing Henry singled out was, in fact, the 
only real barn hereabouts, although it had no visible distinguishing marks. Furthermore, 
the barn Henry saw was modally robust. In all the nearby possible worlds, that barn 
was present (and was a barn). The people here take that barn very seriously; if it ever 
fell down, the entire town would make its restoration their first priority. No one would 
dream of putting a fake barn there.” 
      
(ibid., p.524) 
 
Ichikawa agrees with Sosa that subjective distinguishability is not symmetric: if we 
can tell we are in an awake state when we are awake, it means awake states are 
distinguishable from dream states. This does not cause a pressing epistemic threat. 
However, Ichikawa thinks the special epistemic status of “I think. Therefore I am 
awake.”, which Sosa claims to be able to dispel the epistemic threat, does not really 
resolve the problem as assumed. Both Rip’s and Henry’s beliefs happen to be true by 
luck. They do not constitute knowledge and do not dispel any epistemic threat brought 
by the problem. 
      
2.2 Can the denial of belief in dreams collapse A1, A2 and resolve the 
phenomenological aspect of the problem? 
In order to show A1 is unsound, the focus should be put on awake states but not dream 




states are. The denial of belief in dreams does not collapse A1 at all. To collapse A1, 
we need to show it is possible for the subject to know she is in an awake state when 
she is awake. The epistemological aspect of the problem needs to be resolved first. If 
dream states and awake states are fundamentally indistinguishable, A1 stands. To do 
this, we need to focus on objective evidences which mark the differences between 
these two kinds of states plus the subject’s ability to discern those differences, unlike 
unreliable introspection of whether one holds beliefs, like Sosa’s approach.79  
      
As shown, denial of belief in dreams, which is a negative approach of showing what 
dreams are not, does not collapse A1. Does such a negative approach collapse A2 and 
resolve the phenomenological aspect of the problem? The answer is negative, 
unfortunately. As briefly mentioned, the way they distinguish between belief and 
quasi-belief which involves (unreliable) subjective introspection. The subject does not 
know whether she is really “believing or quasi-believing”. This is just ad hoc and does 
not help resolve the problem at all. In order to show A2 is unsound, one needs to show 
that the subject can know she is in a dream state when she is really in a dream state. 
Sosa’s and Ichikawa’s accounts of the denial of belief in dreams do not show that and 
therefore do not collapse A2. For the phenomenological aspect of the problem, they do 
not address lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming at all. Therefore, this aspect 
remains unresolved. 
      
Ichikawa thinks the imagination model of dreaming, the denial of belief in particular, 
leads to a new way of understanding the problem. Unlike the traditional Cartesian 
                                                     
79 Ichikawa’s account implies that the denial of belief does not resolve the epistemological aspect of 
the problem. One cannot reject A1 if the epistemological aspect of the problem remains unresolved. 




skeptical worries which are based on false beliefs, 80  the consequence of the 
imagination view is that even if we do not believe and therefore there is no false belief 
in dreams, it does not mean we can distinguish between dream states and awake states 
and the problem is still there. He holds that these two kinds of states are essentially 
similar, which grounds worries that we may mistakenly confuse the two and cannot 
tell which state we are in. That implies that, to Ichikawa, the denial of belief does not 
resolve the problem, as opposed to Sosa’s view. However, Ichikawa (2008) says “we 
do not, in typical (waking) situations, confuse the two; we do, for the most part, 
manage to know which things we believe and which we imagine” (p.527). Moreover, 
he draws a sharp distinction between percepts and images.81 This means he also holds 
that there are essential differences between awake states and dream states. However, 
he thinks those differences does not help resolve (the epistemological aspect of) the 
problem. This puts the problem in an unnecessarily stronger form. The problem is 
presented as awake states and dream states being fundamentally indistinguishable in 
the First Meditation. The basis of the problem is the fundamentally indistinguishable 
features of these two kinds of states. Descartes resolves the (epistemological aspect of 
the) problem in the Sixth Meditation. The basis of the problem shifts from the features 
of the states to the awareness of the subject. Ichikawa’s approach just leads us back to 
the epistemological aspect of the problem and makes the problem harder to resolve. 
Sosa’s account does not resolve but Ichikawa’s account even worsens the problem. 
 
I do not think the denial of belief in dreams is an approach of value in resolving the 
problem. It does not resolve any form of the problem, nor does it resolve any aspect of 
the problem. Such an approach sticks to the awake-state stereotyped conception of 
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imaginings as being high-order (with the subject’s awareness of the imagining state) 
where the subject does not believe the content of imagination to be real. This does not 
help but worsens the problem, namely why the subject does not know she is in an 
imagining state and tells so in non-lucid dreaming, if dream states are imagining states 
where the subject is supposed not to take the content to be real. The thing that matters 
is not whether we have belief or not in dreams. The thing that matters should be: if 
dream states and awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable and we can tell 
we are in an awake state when we are awake, then why we cannot tell we are in a 
dream state in non-lucid dreaming. We should aim at providing an explanation of why 
there is non-lucid dreaming and also lucid dreaming (resolving the phenomenological 
aspect of the problem), as well as exploring the relations between them and in what 
sense dreaming poses a lesser threat. 
 
3. The consequence of denying belief in dreams 
One problem of denying belief in dreams is that it is difficult to account for emotions 
in dreams. Most of us encounter emotions in dreams. When we dream about being 
chased by a lion or a monster, we feel fear. When we dream about something pleasant, 
for example having a big feast, we feel delighted. When we dream about something 
undesirable, for example failing an exam, we feel negative emotions like anxiety, 
despair and so on. Sometimes, tears may come out when we are overcome with grief 
in dreams. I have had that kind of experience personally. This is also consistent with 
dream research which shows that there are emotions in dreams (Merritt et al., 1994; 
St-Onge et al., 2005). If we do not believe the dream content at all, as Ichikawa and 
Sosa put it, why do we have emotions in dreams? Where do those emotions come from? 




necessarily caused by beliefs. It is possible to have emotions without having beliefs 
(p.118). Morreall (1993) claims that there are cases where emotions are not caused by 
belief, for example, fear in lower animals and infants which does not involve any belief. 
 
“But while fear protects us and other animals in potentially dangerous situations, it 
does not require us or them to recognize danger, or even to recognize objects. Like the 
automatic reflex that makes our hand snap away from the hot frying pan milliseconds 
after we touch it… some fear does not involve mental representations or intentional 
objects.” 
(ibid., p. 361) 
 
The examples he gives involve physiological processes (reflex action). Those are some 
of the body’s defense mechanism to make the subject stay away from danger so as to 
survive. It is questionable whether emotions are physiological reflex actions.82 It is 
not implausible to separate emotions from those reflex actions.83 It is questionable 
whether it is emotion or the physiological reflex that protects us from physical danger. 
Moreover, in the above cases, emotions, if there are any, are caused by external sensory 
inputs.84 Such cases are not applicable to dreaming and do not support the claim that 
emotions are not caused by belief in dreams. I can have emotions without holding a 
particular belief or intention to do any action, on one condition, which is the presence 
of external stimuli. The emotions in question (in dreams) are the ones that correspond 
to dream content which are not caused by external sensory stimuli. If those emotions 
are not caused by belief, where do they come from? Ichikawa owes us an explanation 
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83 I may feel pain and fear after those reflex actions. 





in this respect. 
 
The second solution Ichikawa attempts to give is to deny emotions in dreams: we do 
not have emotions but quasi-emotions.85 Does that help? First, we need to look at the 
distinction between emotions and quasi-emotions. 86  At the beginning of Fearing 
Fictions, Walton (1978) invites us to consider whether emotional responses involved 
in fiction are genuine emotions: 
 
“Charles is watching a horror movie about a terrible green slime. He cringes in his seat 
as the slime oozes slowly but relentlessly over the earth destroying everything in its 
path. Soon a greasy head emerges from the undulating mass, and two beady eyes roll 
around, finally fixing on the camera. The slime, picking up speed, oozes on a new 
course straight toward the viewers. Charles emits a shriek and clutches desperately at 




He goes on arguing that Charles is not experiencing genuine emotions: 
“Charles's state is crucially different from that of a person with an ordinary case of fear. 
The fact that Charles is fully aware that the slime is fictional is, I think, good reason 
to deny that what he feels is fear. It seems a principle of common sense, one which 
ought not to be abandoned if there is any reasonable alternative, that fear must be 
accompanied by, or must involve, a belief that one is in danger. Charles does not 
                                                     
85 He claims we do not have emotions in dreams except quasi-emotions that we have when we engage 
ourselves in fictions. In the remaining part, when I talk about quasi-emotions, I refer to Ichikawa’s sense 
of using this term, that is those involved in fiction. He does not give a detailed explanation over what 
distinguishes quasi-emotions from emotions. 




believe that he is in danger; so he is not afraid.” 
(ibid., p.7) 
 
Walton does not deny the physiological responses of Charles. However, he does not 
think he is experiencing genuine fear. Rather, he calls what Charles is experiencing 
“quasi-fear”. Quasi-fear can be very much akin to genuine fear, in terms of 
physiological responses the subject is experiencing (Walton, 1978, p.6). Walton thinks 
Charles is not experiencing genuine fear because he is aware of the fictional content 
he is experiencing and does not believe the green slime is real. Here belief plays a 
crucial role: one is having genuine fear only if one believes one is in danger. Some 
opponent defending the claim that Charles is having genuine fear may argue that 
Charles does believe the green slime is real, to a certain degree. Walton (1978) replies, 
“If he half believed, and were half afraid, we would expect him to have some 
inclination to act on his fear in the normal ways. Even a hesitant belief, a mere 
suspicion, that the slime is real would induce any normal person seriously to consider 
calling the police and warning his family. Charles gives no thought whatever to such 
courses of action. He is not uncertain whether the slime is real; he is perfectly sure that 
it is not.” 
(p.7) 
 
From the above quotations, we can see that corresponding belief and inclination 
(intention) to carry out (particular) courses of action play an essential role in deciding 
whether the subject is having genuine emotions or quasi-emotions. If the subject does 
not hold a corresponding belief or intention to act, she is having quasi-emotions rather 




quasi-emotions during dreaming. This is not obvious. As mentioned above in section 
1.4 of this chapter (about moral responsibility), intention, which involves mental 
content, may not be fully accessible to us. We may be mistaken about our mental 
content. It is not good to use intention to judge whether dreamers are having genuine 
or quasi-emotions during dreaming, due to the uncertainty of mental content.87 It is 
not uncontroversial to claim that emotions experienced in dreams are quasi-emotions. 
It makes sense to say lucid dreamers are having quasi-emotions during dreaming as 
they are aware of the fact that they are dreaming (imagining). They do not believe the 
dream content is real in dreams. 88  The case of non-lucid dreaming is more 
controversial. Non-lucid dreamers are not aware of the fact that they are dreaming. It 
makes sense to say they believe the dream content is real, intend to act (but fail to 
manifest in behavior due to the restricted bodily condition in sleep), and are having 
genuine emotions during dreaming, according to how Walton draws the distinction 
between genuine emotions and quasi-emotions.  
 
It is not clearly obvious and uncontroversial to claim emotions experienced in dreams 
are quasi-emotions, as shown in the case of non-lucid dreaming. Employing the 
concept of quasi-emotions does not help account for where the emotional responses 
come from in non-lucid dreaming. Dreams are internally caused, so are emotional 
responses in dreams. In this sense, the most probable cause of emotional responses is 
belief. For the dreaming subject to have emotions in a process which is not externally 
caused, the subject needs to believe the content of imagination to a certain degree. If 
the subject believes the content of imagination without being aware of the fact that the 
                                                     
87 Moreover, during dreaming, the sleeping body is generally deactivated. Even if the dreaming subject 
intends to act (responding to the dream content), the sleeping state of the body much restricts movement 
and thus action or behavior. 
88 It is questionable whether lucid dreamers intends to act or not in their dreams. It makes sense to say 




content is caused by the imagination faculty, as in non-lucid dreaming, she mistakenly 
takes (wholly) internally generated imaginings to be percepts and the emotions may 
be stronger. If she believes the content of imagination with the awareness of the fact 
that the content is caused by imagination, as in lucid dreaming, she may have weaker 
emotions. The intensity of emotions may depend on the vividness of the dream in this 
case.89 
 
Beliefs and imaginings are not mutually exclusive. Lower-order imaginings may 
involve false beliefs and that may help account for the strong emotional responses (not 
just in dreaming but also in some awake-state lower-order imaginings such as those of 
schizophrenic patients). This does not necessarily pose a great threat to the whole 
knowledge system as not all beliefs are perceptual beliefs which are building blocks 
of perceptual knowledge. Endorsing the imagination view of dreaming while taking 
dream beliefs to be a kind of belief may help us further study the relations between 
beliefs and imaginings, which may help give some insight into the study of dreaming, 
imagination, and belief. If we just stick to the awake-state stereotyped conception of 
belief as being perceptual and functional, we will hinder a fair study of dreaming and 
a more in-depth look into belief. 
      
4. Concluding remarks 
Sosa and Ichikawa deny beliefs occur in dreams for two main reasons: a lack of a 
functional role of belief in dreams and belief inconsistency between long-standing 
beliefs and dream beliefs. They believe the acceptance of belief in dreams will 
undermine the reliability of the whole knowledge system (about what the external 
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world is like).  Ichikawa (2009) claims it has been difficult to draw an all-embracing 
account of belief so as to include dream beliefs (p. 115). In awake states, belief usually 
plays a functional role which enables the subject to realize more about the external 
world. Because of such a functional role, perceptual beliefs, those formed by a rational 
subject on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence, are usually knowledge 
about the external world, if true. However, perceptual beliefs are not the only kind of 
beliefs. There are beliefs which are not necessarily formed from perceptual experience 
and are not building blocks of perceptual knowledge (about what the external world is 
like), for example, belief in ghosts, belief involving value-laden judgment and belief 
over the content of imagination. This shows that it is not the case that all beliefs are 
building blocks of knowledge and have a chance of threatening the knowledge system. 
Using the functional profile of perceptual belief to deny belief in dreams involves a 
kind of awake-state stereotyped conception of belief and is not a fair treatment of 
dreaming. 
 
It is misguided for Ichikawa and Sosa to deny belief in dreams due to the lack of a 
functional role of perceptual belief. They misconstrue dream beliefs as a pressing 
epistemic threat where they interpret dream beliefs in the form of perceptual beliefs. 
However, dream beliefs are not perceptual beliefs. I interpret dream beliefs in the form 
of the subject believing the content of imagination, with or without the awareness of 
the imagining state. If the subject is aware of the imagining state, she does not believe 
the content is real but believes what the content looks like to her. If the subject is not 
aware of the imagining state, she mistakenly believes the content is real. Such an 
interpretation of dream belief can account for the emotional response of the dreaming 




response of the dreaming subject to the dream content. In non-lucid dreaming, the 
subject may have stronger emotions while in lucid dreaming, the subject may have 
weaker emotions. The denial of belief cannot satisfactorily explain the emotional 
response of the subject, especially in non-lucid dreaming.  
 
Sosa and Ichikawa deny that beliefs occur in dreams for similar reasons. However, 
they hold a different view on the consequence of such an approach. Sosa thinks it can 
resolve the awake-dreaming indistinguishability problem while Ichikawa disagrees. To 
Sosa, false beliefs are the basis of the problem. If dreams do not cause beliefs, we do 
not form false beliefs and the problem is resolved. Ichikawa does not think that is 
sufficient to resolve the problem, even though he agrees with Sosa that we do not form 
false beliefs in dreams. To Ichikawa, dreams as products of imagination alters our 
traditional understanding of the problem which assumes that false beliefs are the cause 
of problem. If dreams are products of imagination, no belief results during dreaming 
and the problem is supposed to be resolved. However, we may still be mistaken in 
judging whether we are being awake or dreaming, given the considerably similar 
experiential characters between awake states and dream states.  
 
The denial of belief in dreams is just an ad hoc approach and does not resolve the 
problem. It does not resolve any form or any aspect of the problem. Sosa is mistaken 
in thinking that it can resolve the epistemological aspect of the problem and show A1 
is unsound. Reflective knowledge is only possible if dream states and awake states are 
not fundamentally indistinguishable. If they have identical content, knowledge is not 
possible. Ichikawa thinks the denial of belief in dreams does not resolve but leads us 




dreams states and awake states that constitutes the problem. He says he is not a sceptic 
and thinks in awake states we do not confuse the two kinds of states (Ichikawa, 2008, 
p. 527). Nonetheless, he does not elucidate how the problem can be resolved. The fact 
that he attempts to provide solutions and the fact that he thinks the solutions cannot 
resolve the problem makes the matter even more complicated. If he thinks dream states 
and awake states have essentially different features and we can tell we are in an awake 
state when we are actually in an awake state, that means they can be distinguished 
from one another. I will attempt to delineate the details of how the problem can be 





CHAPTER 3: A Modified Version 
As we have seen, (different versions of) the imagination view of dreaming fails to 
resolve the problem. However, it does not mean the imagination view of dreaming 
cannot resolve the problem. In this chapter, I will attempt to modify such a view to 
resolve the problem.  
 
1. Why dreams are products of imagination: 
The traditional debate on the nature of dream experiences concerns whether the 
dreaming process is closer to perception or imagination. Some philosophers, for 
example McGinn and Ichikawa, assume a sharp distinction between perception and 
imagination. In fact, studies have shown that perception and imagination share more 
similarities than assumed. Objective empirical evidence shows that these two 
processes involve overlapped activation areas in brain regions (Kosslyn et al., 1997). 
Moreover, Nany (2010) advocates the concept of amodal perception where mental 
images are used to represent the “occluded” parts of perceived object, which shows 
that imagination is an important element of perception. The Perky experiment (1910) 
shows the possibility of the subject mistakenly taking percepts to be imaginings. From 
the above evidence, it is misguided to draw a sharp distinction between perception and 
imagination. However, that does not mean we can equate these two processes. Despite 
the fact that they share more similarities than normally assumed, there are some 
significant differences between them which ground the claim that the dreaming 
process is closer to imagination rather than perception. First, as argued in chapter 2a, 
perception involves appropriate causal relations between the external environment and 
the subject’s interpretation of the external inputs. In order to justify the claim that a 




external stimulation to which the subject’s interpretation (the internal representation) 
of the signal corresponds. Second, according to Gibson (1970)’s sense-organ 
adjustment test, a change in sense-organ’s status yields a change in stimulation. In this 
case, a change in (external) stimulation will result in a direct corresponding change in 
the internal representation of the external stimulus. Due to these two criteria, dreaming 
fails to fall in the scope of perceptual experience: there is no external stimulation to 
which the content of dreams corresponds and therefore a change in external stimulation 
does not result in a (directly) corresponding change in dream content.90  
 
Dreams involve features of imagination: abrupt scene switches, fictional content and 
possible control. Imagination seems to be the only process which fits the features of 
dreams. Why not say dreaming is just a unique process that is distinct from other 
mental processes? First, I think dreams are products of imagination because of the 
features stated above. Second, taking dreams to be products of imagination can help 
us further explore the realm of imagination, the study of which far from being 
exhausted. Dreams as products of imagination also sheds light on the study of 
consciousness.  
 
2. How to resolve the problem 
2.1. The epistemological aspect  
In order to resolve this aspect of the problem, we need to show that dream states and 
awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. To show that, we need to 
delineate the essential difference(s) between these two kinds of states, plus the 
subject’s ability to discern the difference and tell which state she is in when she is 
                                                     




really in that state.  
 
The key difference between awake states and dream states is that awake states grant 
the possibility of perceptual knowledge about what the external world is like while 
dream states do not grant this. Percepts are building blocks of perceptual knowledge. 
The key difference between awake states and dream states in terms of the yielding of 
perceptual knowledge sticks to the key difference between percepts and images. Note 
that awake states are a necessary but not a sufficient condition of percepts and 
perceptual knowledge. Consider the case of schizophrenic patients: when they are 
overcome by the disease, they can be awake but driven by lower-order imagination 
which is not a building block of knowledge. However, percepts are a sufficient 
condition of awake states.91 In order to tell whether we are in an awake state, we can 
test whether we are having percepts or not. The key difference between percepts and 
images in terms of the yielding of perceptual knowledge adheres to the different causal 
relations between inputs and the subject’s interpretation of internal representation of 
the inputs. To test whether something is a percept or an image, we can use the sense-
organs adjustment test. If a change in sense-organs status results in a directly 
corresponding change in (external) stimulation, it is a percept and a building block of 
perceptual knowledge; if a change in sense-organ status does not result in a change in 
stimulation, it is an image.92 This shows that dream states and awake states are not 
identical in feature.93 In awake states, we can apply this test and tell whether we are 
                                                     
91 We have to be awake in order to perceive. 
92 The subject’s background knowledge and logical thinking skills are needed to judge whether she is 
really doing the test or imagining doing the test. She needs to observe the results of the test, for example 
to see whether it complies with the law of nature. It is questionable whether one can imagine everything 
exactly the same as the real world, for example, imagining a corresponding change in stimulation (when 
doing the test) exactly the same as that of percepts. If there is, the test may not be useful anymore, but 
I personally think this is unlikely to happen, at least not generally, given the differences between 
percepts and images stated throughout this thesis. In most cases, the test is still useful. 




in an awake state and whether what we (seem to) perceive is really a percept. This 
shows that awake states and dream states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. At 
least we can distinguish awake states from dream states. Then how about dream states? 
Can we apply the test in dream states and tell we are in a dream state? First, during 
sleep, the body is not actively receiving and interpreting external signals as the way it 
does during awake states. In this sense, the body can be understood as being inactive 
(in a functional sense). 94  Then it is not of much value to use the sense-organ 
adjustment test in dream states, as the sense organs are not actively working. Moreover, 
due to “attenuated activation” of the prefrontal cortex during rapid eye movement sleep, 
the dreaming subject is deprived of the ability to think in a logical way (Voss et al., 
2013, p. 8).95 The dreaming subject may not be able to note the dream features (for 
example, bizarre content and abrupt shift of scenes) and tell she is in a dream state. 
That explains the occurrence of non-lucid dreaming. If a dreaming subject is able to 
note the contra-reality features of dreams and tell she is in a dream state, there will be 
lucid dreaming.96 This shows that it is not the content or feature of dreams that makes 
one unable to tell she is in a dream state. Rather, the inability to tell one is in a dream 
state is caused by the unawareness problem of the subject which may arise 
independently of the dream content. I will return to this issue when I attempt to resolve 
the phenomenological aspect of the problem below. The salient point here is that dream 
states and awake states do not have identical experiential characters and are not 
fundamentally indistinguishable. In this case, we can restore the reliability of 
perceptual knowledge and no pressing epistemic threat results.  
 
                                                     
94 Some of the senses, for example eyes, are even closed during sleep and dream states. 
95 The ability to think in a logical way is present in rational subjects during awake states. 
96  Both lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming can have bizarre or reality-resembling content. 
However, that does not mean dream states involve reality-replicating content and share identical 




One may question that whether one is fundamentally unable to tell whether she is in a 
dream state. The occurrence of lucid dreaming shows that this is not the case. At least 
there are cases where we can tell we are in a dream state, so we are not doomed to be 
unable to tell we are in a dream state when we are really so. The point is how we 
become lucid in dreams and whether lucidity can be trained, which will be discussed 
in section 2.3 in this chapter. The occurrence of non-lucid dreaming (and also lucid 
dreaming) does question the reliability of one’s access to (and also control over) one’s 
mental content. 
 
2.2. A1 & A2 
A1:  
Let us recall the conclusion of A1: the subject cannot know she is an awake state when 
she is really so. When we grant that there are essential differences between percepts 
and images, the next question is whether we can distinguish between them and tell 
which state we are in. As mentioned in the previous section, we can apply the sense-
organ adjustment test to distinguish between percepts and images and tell whether we 
are in an awake state. Rational agents can differentiate between awake states and 
dream states and tell whether they are awake or not. In this case, P1 is false and A1 is 
shown to be unsound.97 However, there is another problem. As mentioned in the 
previous section, awake states are just a necessary but not a sufficient condition of 
having percepts and perceptual knowledge. The cases of schizophrenic patients show 
that perceptual knowledge is not guaranteed in awake states. The presence of such 
irrational cases in awake states creates another problem: although there are essential 
differences between percepts and images, there is nothing that can rule out the subject 
                                                     
97 Recall that P1 of A1 is: nothing can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in a dream 




being duped into believing she is perceiving when she is actually imagining. Even if 
A1 can be shown to be unsound, awake-state lower-order imaginings (without the 
subject’s awareness of the imagining state) shows the possibility of irrationality in 
awake states. However, that does not pose a pressing epistemic threat. Collapsing A1 
shows that perceptual knowledge is possible and the (general) reliability of perceptual 
knowledge is restored. Using the cases of irrationality to deny the possibility of 
perceptual knowledge puts the problem in an unnecessarily strong form. This is similar 
to the dream case. Because of the lack of awake-state rationality in dreams, dreamers 
usually cannot relate themselves to the dream events in an appropriate way. If this is 
used to deny the possibility of dream-awareness in dreams, it puts the problem in an 
unnecessarily strong form.  
 
A2:  
Let us recall the conclusion of A2: the subject cannot know she is in a dream state 
when she is really so. The occurrence of non-lucid dreaming shows that there is 
nothing that can rule out the subject being duped into believing she is in an awake state 
when she is actually in a dream state.98 Even if so, the subject can know she is in a 
dream state when she is really so. This can be shown by the occurrence of lucid 
dreaming, which proves that P2 is false and the whole argument of A2 collapses.  
2.3. The phenomenological aspect 
When we resolve this aspect of the problem, we attempt to fill in the gap between non-
lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming to lessen the threat posed by dreaming.  
 
                                                     
98 Although there are essential differences between awake states and dream states, the ability to discern 





Non-lucid dreaming is usually defined as the subject being unaware of the fact that 
one is in a dream state while lucid dreaming is usually defined as the subject being 
aware of the fact that one is in a dream state during dreaming. However, it is misguided 
to draw a sharp distinction between lucid dreaming and non-lucid dreaming. 
According to Noreika et al. (2010), there are different degrees of lucidity in dreams: 
A-lucidity, C-lucidity, B-lucidity and E-lucidity:  
 
“A-lucidity” refers to “introspective attention directed at the construction process that 
creates phenomenal representations”;  
“C-lucidity” involves a stronger concept of lucidity, with “the additional capacity to 
form mental concepts and engage in abstract thought”: “we are not only introspectively 
aware of certain aspects of the construction process that brings the phenomenal 
contents about, but can also form a mental concept of ourselves as currently 
experiencing a lucid dream”; 
“B-lucidity” refers to lucidity where “lucid behavior arises independently of 
metacognitive insight” (dream control, also possible in non-lucid dreaming); 





C-lucidity is said to be a minimal condition for dream lucidity. A-, B- and E-lucidity 
are essential elements of full-fledged lucidity, but they are neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for one to know she is in a dream state. We can have A-lucidity 




to be pre-lucid. Pre-lucid dreams are dreams where the subject wonders whether she 
is in a dream state or becomes aware of the unreal features of dreams without coming 
to the conclusion that she is in a dream state (ibid., p.40). Due to the inability of the 
subject to tell she is in a dream state, pre-lucid dreamers belong to the group of non-
lucid dreamers, rather than the group of lucid dreamers. Pre-lucid dreaming acts as an 
important element to bridge the gap between non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming, 
showing that they are gradually distinguished along a continuum rather than being 
clearly distinct.  
 
One key question is how we become lucid in dreams.99 Do lucid dreams emerge from 
the very beginning of the dream? Can we become lucid in the middle of a non-lucid 
dream and turn non-lucid dreams into lucid ones? Is there any relation between lucidity 
and dream features? Does lucidity depend on dream features? Do we become lucid 
because we attend to and reflect on the unreal features of dreams or does the awareness 
of the fact that one is in a dream state come suddenly which enables us to note the 
unreal features of dreams?100 If lucidity depends on dream features,101 we should be 
able to tell we are in a dream state, given that there seems to be no reality-replicating 
dreams. Then why do we have non-lucid dreaming? One plausible explanation is that 
it is not the content of dreams which accounts for the unawareness problem in the 
dream state. Then can we resolve the unawareness problem in dream states? Is it 
possible that a nonlucid dreamer become lucid in the same dream? Can non-lucid 
dreamers be trained to be lucid dreamers? Voss et al. (2013) summarise studies 
suggesting that “lucidity only rarely arises from the recognition of bizarre elements in 
                                                     
99 That refers to lucid dreams where one knows she is in a dream state. 
100 In the latter case, there is no need to attend to the unreal features of dreams in order to draw the 
conclusion that one is in a dream state. 





dreams” and claim their study confirms that “while lucidity involves cognitive insight 
into the fact that one is dreaming, this insight is not necessarily the outcome of a 
reasoning process” (p. 19). Does that mean the problem of unawareness in dream state 
cannot be resolved? 
 
2.4. Lucid dreaming is a trainable skill 
According to a study conducted by Zadra et al. (1992), lucid dreaming is a learnable 
skill and can be trained: non-lucid dreamers can be trained to become lucid dreamers; 
lucid dreamers can be trained to enhance the frequency of the occurrence of lucid 
dreams. The lucid dream induction (LDI) technique is as follows: 
 
(1) The subject should ask himself the critical question ("am I dreaming or not'?") at 
least five to ten times a day.  
(2) At the same time the subject should try to imagine intensely that he is in a dream 
state, that is, that everything he perceives, including his own body, is merely a dream. 
(3) While asking himself the critical question the subject should concentrate not only 
on contemporary occurrences, but also on events which have already taken place. Does 
he come upon something unusual, or does he suffer from lapses of memory? A minute 
suffices to answer the question.  
(4) The subject should ask himself the critical question as a rule in all situations which 
are characteristic for dreams, that is, whenever something surprising or improbable 
occurs or whenever he experiences powerful emotions.  
(5) It is especially helpful in learning how to dream lucidly if the subject has dreams 
with a recurrent content. For example, if he frequently has feelings of fear or often sees 




of consciousness whenever he finds himself in threatening situations or sees a dog in 
the daytime.  
(6) If the subject often has dream experiences which never or rarely occur in a waking 
state, such as floating or flying, then he should, while awake, try intensely to imagine 
that he is having such an experience, telling himself that he is dreaming.  
(7) If the subject has difficulty recalling his normal dreams, he should employ methods 
for improving dream recollection such as are described in recent literature on dreaming. 
In most cases, however, practice in attaining the critical-reflective frame of mind will 
improve the subject's ability to recall his dreams.  
(8) The subject should go to sleep thinking that he is going to attain awareness of 
dreaming while in this state. Any conscious effort of will must be avoided while 
thinking this thought. This method is especially effective when the subject has just 
awakened in the early morning hours and has the feeling that he is about to fall asleep 
again. 
(9) The subject should resolve to carry out a particular action while dreaming. Simple 
motions are sufficient. 
 
(ibid., pp. 86-87) 
 
The use of this technique further supports the claim that dream states and awake states 
do not have identical content (experiential characters) and are not fundamentally 
indistinguishable. Awake-state rationality (the ability to attend to the experiential 
evidence to make a well-justified judgment over the state one is currently in) can be 
induced into dreaming through training. 102  This paves way for resolving the 
                                                     
102 This ability is absent in non-lucid dreaming but present in full-fledged lucid dreams where there are 




unawareness problem in dream states.  
 
The majority of lucid dreams arises from non-lucid dreams, lucid dreaming can be 
thought as “fulfilling a positive function in restoring higher-order consciousness and a 
stable sense of self” (Voss et al., 2013, pp. 19-20). Rational thinking which is present 
in rational subjects can be restored in dreaming. We may not be able to make all dreams 
lucid, but the trainability of lucid dreaming marks that the unawareness problem in 
dream states is resolvable and further lessens the threat posed by (non-lucid) dreaming. 
 
Noreika et al. (2010) summarise from several studies that “even in nonlucid dreams, 
cognitive activities such as speech and thought play a more prominent role than was 
previously believed” (p. 39). Thinking (reflection) is possible even in non-lucid 
dreaming: non-lucid dreamers are able to “reflect upon their own actions in response 
to the events occurring within the dream, but they fail to realize that these actions and 
events are taking place within a dream world, rather than in the real world” (Voss et 
al., 2013, p. 10); “thinking about one’s own mental states and behavior, is not 
completely absent in nonlucid dreams. What is missing is only the particular type of 
metacognition that allows the dreamer to realize the fact that she is dreaming rather 
than awake” (Noreika et al., 2010, p. 41). If the subject is able to reflect on the relation 
between the dream self and the dream world, he will realize he is dreaming and become 
lucid. The trainability of lucid dreaming shows that it is possible for the dreamer to 
reflect on the dream content to realize the fact that she is dreaming.  
 
3. Dreaming and consciousness 




secondary consciousness. Primary consciousness, which is often known as lower-order 
consciousness, refers to the sense that the subject is restricted to “immediate scene”, 
“is characterized by a fusion of past, present, and future”: “an attenuation of both long- 
and short-term memory and an inability to engage in deliberate planning or behavioral 
control” as the inability “to control and influence the ongoing experience” (Voss et al., 
2013, p. 9). Secondary (higher-order) consciousness refers to the state where the subject 
can “plan ahead, reflect on his past and…contemplate his future” (ibid., p. 9). 
Secondary consciousness involves “additional semantic or narrative capabilities”. 
Non-lucid dreaming involves features of both primary and secondary consciousness: 
the subject is restricted to the immediate dream scene and the inability to deliberately 
control the content but she also engages in different thinking processes which involves 
linguistic capabilities featured in secondary consciousness. Lucid dreaming also 
involves both primary and secondary consciousness. It shows that dreaming is a 
conscious experience and more importantly non-lucid dreaming involves some feature 
of higher-order consciousness and the process is more intellectual than we assume. 
This paves the way for (full-fledged) lucidity in dreams. The process of non-lucid 
dreaming is thought to be more akin to primary conscious experiences while lucid 
dreaming is considered as demonstrating secondary (higher-order) consciousness. It 
shows that secondary consciousness is not only present in awake states. It can also be 
present in dream states. More importantly, lower-order consciousness in dream states 
can be transformed into higher-order one and reflective ability can be trained. This not 
only provides insight for the study of consciousness but may also provide insight for 
the treatment for psychotic patients who suffer from a deficient reflective ability. 
 




Some scholars draw an analogy between dreaming and (waking) psychosis (Vogel, 
1968; Dresler et al., 2015). One may question whether this is an appropriate analogy. 
Dreaming is a commonplace daily experience. How can we be perfectly normal during 
awake states and suffer from a psychosis (be mentally ill) during dream states? There 
are a lot of similarities between dream states and psychotic states, for example 
“implausible thought connections” and “loss of volitional control”, which suggests that 
these two kinds of states may be underlain by the same mechanism (Vogel, 1968).  
Recent electroencephalogram (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) data substantiate the analogy between non-lucid dreaming and psychotic state 
(Dresler et al., 2015). There is a key difference between dreaming and psychosis which 
results in different epistemic consequences brought by dream states and psychotic 
states. First, awake states and dream states are not compatible with each other. If I am 
awake, I cannot be dreaming; if I am dreaming, I cannot be awake. However, this is 
not the case of psychosis. Awake states and psychotic states are compatible. I can be 
awake and in a psychotic state. Psychotic states pose a greater threat than dream states 
do, not to the general reliability of perceptual knowledge but to subject’s judgement 
over what the external world is like and such mistaken judgment may affect the 
subject’s behavior and can put the subject in danger. The subject may act according to 
his imaginings without awareness of the imagining state. This may pose a threat to his 
life, for example, committing suicide upon imagining a voice threatening him to die. 
Such a risk is not the case of dreaming because the body of the dreaming subject is at 
rest where action does not usually follow from dream content. Usually the dreaming 
subject does not act according to the dream content and dreaming poses a lesser threat. 
Moreover, patients in psychotic states may have difficulties socializing with others 




state which is reckoned as crazy by others. However, that is not the case of dreaming, 
which is a mental experience. What the dreamer thinks in dreams remains in his mind 
and is not manifest to others. There is no direct relationship between dreaming and 
socialization. 
 
There is one advantage of studying the relationship between dreaming and psychosis. 
Some scientific research suggests that regions related to “psychotic insight deficits” 
are highly activated in lucid dreaming, which “empirically substantiates the analogy 
between metacognitive impairments in psychosis and non-lucid dreaming” (Dresler et 
al., 2015, p. 97). This means that if lucid dreaming can be trained, it may be possible 
to resolve the problem of psychosis. The LDI technique may provide some valuable 
insight for the treatment of psychosis. Future study on the effectiveness of LDI 
technique in curing psychotic patients can be carried out to find out detailed relations 
between lucid dreaming and the curing of psychosis. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Empirical studies have shown that non-lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming fall on a 
continuum rather than being clearly distinct. This shows that non-lucid dreaming is not 
as pressing a challenge for the imagination view of dreaming as normally assumed. 
The occurrence of non-lucid dreaming does not pose an epistemic threat that matters 
to the general reliability of perceptual knowledge about what the external world is like. 
The possibility of transforming non-lucid dreaming into lucid dreaming further 
undermines the (phenomenal) threat brought by non-lucid dreaming. This shows the 
possibility of transforming lower-order consciousness into higher-order consciousness 










Dreaming is a common daily experience. If dreams are fundamentally 
indistinguishable from percepts, they will pose a great epistemic threat to the reliability 
of perceptual knowledge. One cannot be sure that whether there are reality-replicating 
dreams. It is unlikely to be the case, according to dream research. There are essential 
differences between dream states and awake states. However, those differences are not 
successfully elucidated by sticking to the awake-state stereotyped conception of 
imaginings, as in McGinn’s, Ichikawa’s and Sosa’s approaches, since there is a key 
difference between (non-lucid) dreams and standard awake-state imaginings: the 
subject’s awareness of the actual state is present in the latter while absent in the former. 
When we argue for the view that dreams are products of imagination, we should avoid 
such an awake-state stereotyped conception of imaginings. Rather, we should focus on 
the similarities between dreams and imaginings in terms of their objective features, for 
example, the possibility of involving fictional content, the possibility of a sudden shift 
of scene and the possibility of control over the content without sense-organ adjustment. 
These features of dreams make them belong to the realm of imagination rather than 
perception. This helps avoid the pressing epistemic threat as collapsing perceptual 
knowledge about the external world. We can distinguish them and tell we are in an 
awake state when we are really so, using the sense-organ adjustment test. The features 
of percepts are opposed to those of imaginings, for example, the impossibility of 
control over the content without sense-organ adjustment, the impossibility of a sudden 
shift of scene and the impossibility of involving fictional content in the contexts of real 
objects. The rest to deal with is the phenomenal threat regarding the problem of 
unawareness of the actual state in non-lucid dreams. 




super computer can be postulated as being able to generate imagining experiences 
which are identical to perceptual experiences. In this case, perceptual imaginings (what 
McGinn and Ichikawa call images) are identical to percepts and awake states and 
dream states are fundamentally indistinguishable to the subject. Even if the subject is 
rational and attends to the evidence available, they cannot tell they are in a virtual 
reality on a well-justified basis from the experiential evidence because there is no 
available evidence where they can base their judgment and tell they are in a virtual 
reality. If one postulates the dream phenomenon as being similar to the brain-in-a-vat 
experiment, one puts forward an unnecessarily strong form of epistemic threat posed 
by dreaming. There are essential differences between percepts and images (perceptual 
imaginings). There are essential differences between dream states and awake states. 
We can discern the difference and tell which state we are currently in. Dream states 
and awake states are not fundamentally indistinguishable. It is not an unavoidable form 
of threat. The dreaming phenomenon does not pose a pressing epistemic threat to the 
reliability of perceptual knowledge about what the external world looks like. The 
occurrence of non-lucid dreaming does pose a phenomenal threat to the reliability of 
introspective knowledge, namely whether we can know we are in a dream state or not. 
The occurrence of lucid dreaming shows we can know we are in a dream state. Non-
lucid dreaming and lucid dreaming on a continuum and the trainability of lucid 
dreaming further undermine the phenomenal threat of dreaming. The phenomenal 
threat posed by dreaming may provide some insight for the study of imagination which 
is far from being exhausted. It may question the reliability of introspective knowledge 
not only on whether we can know we are in a dream state (imagining state) but also 
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